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PROPERTY AND PRECAUTION
Lee Anne Fennell*
Property in land suffers from an unacknowledged precautionary deficit.
Ownership is dispensed in standardized blocks of monopoly control that are
routinely retained in their entirety until someone raises an issue regarding
an actual or potential incompatible land use. This arrangement, which
encourages owners to take sustained, unpriced draws against a limited
stock of future flexibility, sets the stage for future impasse as inconsistent
plans develop. It also makes property an unnecessarily accident-prone
institution, given the role that bargaining failure plays in producing costly
land use conflicts. Expanding the slate of potential precautions beyond
owners‟ locational and operational choices to include their choices about
the strength and content of their own entitlements offers new traction on
land use disputes. It also presents interesting institutional and theoretical
challenges. In this essay, I propose using a local option exchange to
confront owners with the opportunity costs of maintaining veto power over
unused, low-valued rights. Enabling owners to relinquish property-rule
protection of such rights before conflicts arise could make property more
flexible and communicative, and hence reduce the costs of incompatible
land uses. This approach requires rethinking the limits of customization in
property bundles and the potential for owner participation in entitlement
definition.
INTRODUCTION
On a Coasean analysis, land use inefficiencies boil down to breakdowns
in bargaining.1 For decades, the economic analysis of property rights has
focused on ways to sidestep these bargaining failures, whether through
well-chosen initial entitlement assignments or mandatory liability rules. Yet
*
Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. For very helpful comments and conversations, I am
grateful to Omri Ben-Shahar, Mary Anne Case, Eric Claeys, Aziz Huq, Edward Iacobucci, Gregory Keating,
Jonathan Masur, Richard McAdams, Jonathan Nash, Eduardo Peñalver, Ariel Porat, Julie Roin, Jennifer Rothman,
Theodore Seto, Troy Rule, Warren Schwartz, Christopher Serkin, and participants in the 2011 annual meeting of
the American Law and Economics Association, the Property, Tort, and Private Law Theory Conference at the
University of Southern California Law School, a University of Toronto Law and Economics Workshop, and
faculty workshops at Loyola Law School Los Angeles, UCLA School of Law, and the University of Chicago Law
School. I thank John O‘Hara and Eric Singer for excellent research assistance, and the Stuart C. and JoAnn
Nathan Faculty Fund for financial support.
1
Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
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the idea that owners might voluntarily reconfigure their entitlements to
reduce the costs of future transactions has received surprisingly little
attention. This omission is puzzling, given that property rights typically
embed veto powers that can create potent impediments to efficient
outcomes.2 In this essay, I examine the advance concession of property
rule protection as a potential precautionary measure capable of reducing the
incidence and cost of land use conflicts. This approach follows logically
from a view of incompatible land uses (and thwarted land use changes) as
slow-motion collisions, given the role that bargaining impasse plays in these
crashes. Owners‘ choices about the strength and shape of their property
entitlements, no less than their decisions about where to locate or how to
conduct a particular enterprise, influence how inconsistent plans for real
property will play out. It follows that these entitlement decisions could
represent a locus of precautionary efforts.
Property scholars working in law and economics are no strangers to the
use of tort-related principles and frameworks. Foundational work by Ronald
Coase and by Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed3 intentionally blurs
the line between property and torts.4 Property theorists have likewise
adapted Calabresi‘s approach to accident costs to their subjects of inquiry.5
But new insights might be gleaned from explicitly thinking about land use
conflicts as a type of low-speed collision in which entitlement structure
2
Whether the strategic holdout problems associated with property rule protection should be classed as a
subset of transaction costs or treated as a separate set of impediments to bargains is open to question. See, e.g.,
Lee Anne Fennell, Common Interest Tragedies, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 928 n. 92 (2004) (collecting cites); cf. HAROLD
DEMSETZ, FROM ECONOMIC MAN TO ECONOMIC SYSTEM: ESSAYS ON HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND THE INSTITUTIONS
OF CAPITALISM 116-17 (2008) (classifying free-rider problems as ―ownership costs‖ rather than ―transaction
costs‖). In this essay, I will refer to holdout costs as a subset of transaction costs, while emphasizing their unique
connection to the institution of property as presently configured.
3
Coase, supra note 1; Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
4
See, e.g., Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 3, at 1089 (noting the need for a ―unified perspective‖ on
property and torts and offering a framework ―integrating the various legal relationships treated by these
subjects‖); Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1
(1985) (using precaution as a unifying principle across doctrinal boundaries, building on Coase‘s work); Thomas
W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 378-79
(describing and critiquing the ―torts perspective‖ on property rights found in the work of Coase and Cooter). The
influence of Coase and of Calabresi and Melamed on property theory and the analysis of land use conflicts has
been well noted. See, e.g., Jeff L. Lewin, Compensated Injunctions and the Evolution of Nuisance Law, 71 IOWA
L. REV. 775, 785-803 (1986); Merrill & Smith, supra, at 366-83.
5
Calabresi‘s approach to accident costs calls for minimizing the sum of accident costs, prevention costs, and
administrative costs. GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 26-31 (1970). This framework has since
been applied to land use questions, among other legal contexts. See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to
Zoning: Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 687-91 (1973); see also
NICOLE STELLE GARNETT, ORDERING THE CITY: LAND USE, POLICING, AND THE RESTORATION OF URBAN
AMERICA 135 (2010) (applying Calabresi‘s framework to order-maintenance and crime control within cities);
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 32-33 (1995) (suggesting that Calabresi‘s
formulation captures ―the social function of law‖); Richard A. Posner, Guido Calabresi‟s The Costs of Accidents:
A Reassessment, 64 MD L. REV. 12, 15 (2005) (describing Calabresi‘s framework as ―simple and useful‖ if ―not
entirely satisfactory‖ and noting its applicability ―to a wide variety of law-regulated activities, whether accidents,
which were Calabresi‘s focus, or pollution, land use, contracts, or virtually any other social activity with which
the law is concerned‖).
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itself represents a potentially dangerous element.6 The design of property
rights, I suggest, represents an underappreciated margin of adjustment
through which we might seek to minimize the costs of land use conflicts
and their prevention.7
That design choices embed precautions and thereby influence the
overall costs of accidents is obvious when we are talking about whether cars
should be built like slow-moving tanks8 or equipped with ―spongy
bumpers.‖9 Yet property scholarship, although steeped in the analysis of
entitlements,10 has done little to examine whether we have designed
property rights packages that deliver the right combination of speed,
maneuverability, crash-resistance, flexibility, and protection.11 Reflection
on this question reveals that we have, in fact, inherited an institution that is
remarkably accident prone—so rigid and brittle, in fact, that new and
incompatible uses must be constantly managed through coercive action.
Property law delivers highly potent, standardized blocks of monopoly
control to landowners by default,12 but offers no simple way for owners to
downgrade their protection selectively and voluntarily in advance of a
conflict. When incompatible land use plans arise, coercive governmental
action often becomes necessary to override owners‘ veto power.13 But
6
The accident analogy has been used by a few scholars in land use contexts, although in a narrower manner
than I employ it here. See, e.g., Eric Kades, Avoiding Takings „Accidents‟: A Tort Perspective on Takings Law, 28
U. RICH. L. REV. 1235, 1263 (1994) (analogizing government condemnation to accidents for purposes of
exploring the potential for private insurance to substitute for government-provided compensation); Louis Kaplow,
An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509, 563 (1986) (distinguishing the accident
scenario from that of legal transitions); see also Eric Claeys, Jefferson Meets Coase: Land-Use Torts, Law and
Economics, and Natural Property Rights, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1379, 1386 (2010) (describing an ―accident
law and economics‖ paradigm concerned with efficiency and discussing its applicability to ―land-use torts‖). Also
distinct from my inquiry are analyses of actual accidents (such as chemical leaks or explosions) that occur on
land. See, e.g., Gregg P. Macey, Coasean Blind Spots: Charting the Incomplete Institutionalism, 98 GEO. L.J.
863 (2010).
7
Efficiency analysis has often focused on minimizing these two sets of costs. See CALABRESI, supra note 5,
at 26 (―Apart from the requirements of justice, I take it as axiomatic that the principal function of accident law is
to reduce the sum of the costs of accidents and the costs of avoiding accidents.‖); Cooter, supra note 4, at 2
(developing a ―model of precaution‖ that examines the interaction between ―the direct cost of harm and the cost of
precautions against it‖); see also text accompanying notes 33-34, supra.
8
See GUIDO CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATTITUDES, AND THE LAW: PRIVATE LAW PERSPECTIVES ON A
PUBLIC LAW PROBLEM 9 (1985) (using this example to illustrate costs of accident prevention).
9
CALABRESI, supra note 5, at 136-39 (using ―spongy bumpers‖ to illustrate an efficient precaution).
10
A large body of economically oriented work on land use entitlements exists, primarily building on the
insights of Coase, supra note 1, and Calabresi and Melamed, supra note 3. See, e.g., Merrill & Smith, supra note
4, at 366-83 (describing these influences on the economic analysis of property rights).
11
Recent work has, however, given greater attention to the ex ante effects of the legal rules surrounding
property entitlements. See Stewart E. Sterk, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Uncertainty about Property
Rights, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1285, 1287 (2008) (observing that the literature has seen a shift to ―ex ante concerns—
developing a legal structure that minimizes the risk of conflict before it arises‖). The possibility that the
assignment and protection of entitlements could affect the likelihood and costliness of later conflict has been
explored in, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Property Rights and Liability Rules: The Ex Ante View of the Cathedral,
100 MICH. L. REV. 601 (2001). See also text accompanying notes 48-53, infra.
12
See, e.g., Stewart E. Sterk, Neighbors in American Land Law, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 55 (1987)
(describing property‘s ―rigid ‗geometric box‘ allocation of rights‖ as well as some departures from it). Property
rule protection over unique assets confers a monopoly power because it gives owners the unqualified right to veto
any proposed transaction. See, e.g., Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 3, at 1092.
13
In other words, exclusion gives way to various forms of governance. See Henry E. Smith, Exclusion
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because these overrides are typically insensitive to the actual valuations of
the entitlement-holders (which may be quite heterogeneous), they generate
new inefficiencies.14
By routinely granting broader monopoly power than is useful to owners
and making it costless to hold onto, existing property arrangements
needlessly impede efficient transactions that could avoid land uses conflicts
and the subsequent application of coercive overrides. Meanwhile, legal
rules that privilege temporal priority, protect existing uses, and base
compensation on actual rather than optimal investments, prompt owners to
aggressively barrel towards a future collision.15 Owners are thus
systematically encouraged to hold onto more extensive property-ruleprotected packages and use them more aggressively than they would if they
internalized the increased accident costs associated with doing so. The
results are reminiscent of drivers who choose heavy SUVs to improve their
personal crash outcomes without considering the effects of their decisions
on the destructiveness of crashes.16 Although the resulting inefficiencies
have not escaped notice, land use conflicts are rarely approached as
collisions that might benefit from precautionary changes to property
entitlements themselves.
What, then, would it mean for property entitlements to incorporate costeffective precautions—the ownership equivalent of crumple zones or brake
lights? For efficiency‘s sake, we would want low-valuing users to cede
their entitlements to higher-valuing ones in the event of a conflict,
preferably through a voluntary market transaction. But by the time such a
conflict arises, a bilateral monopoly dynamic has typically taken hold that
makes such a transaction uncertain and costly.17 Scholars have put
enormous energy into devising ways to reproduce the desired result, but
coercion, whether through liability rules or otherwise, has been an
entrenched part of the story.18 What has received much less attention is the
Versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S453 (2002) These
governance mechanisms need not be top-down command-and-control style restrictions (although they do often
take that form). For example, liability rules permit an owner‘s prerogatives to be overridden, at a price, without
her consent and thus offer a way around the monopoly blocking power inherent in property rule protection. See,
e.g., Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 1, at 1092, 1107.
14
This is a standard concern about eminent domain, but it applies to all liability rules. See, e.g., Richard A.
Epstein, A Clear View of The Cathedral: The Dominance of Property Rules, 106 YALE L.J. 2091, 2093 (1997).
15
See text accompanying notes 28-29, infra.
16
Such problems in the road accident arena are by no means fully addressed by existing tort law, but at least
they are recognized at the level of theory. See, e.g., CALABRESI, supra note 5, at 136-39 (discussing bumper
design as a potential precaution); Warren F. Schwartz, Objective and Subjective Standards of Negligence:
Defining the Reasonable Person to Induce Optimal Care and Optimal Populations of Injurers and Victims, 78
GEO. L.J. 241, 254, 255-57 (1989) (observing that ―one‘s ability to avoid harm while driving is affected by one‘s
choice of the car‘s features and one‘s skill as a driver‖ and presenting an example involving brake quality).
17
See, e.g., Sterk, supra note 12, at 57-58, 69-74 (describing the bilateral monopoly dynamic that can arise
between neighbors and analyzing its effects on transaction costs and the possibility of an efficient bargain); James
E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, Property Rules and Liability Rules: The Cathedral in Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 440, 460-62 (1995).
18
For some examples of work considering how liability rules (and variations thereon) might be configured
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possibility that owners could be induced to identify in advance the lowvalued portions of their property packages and release their monopoly grip
on those elements before a conflict arises.19 Designing entitlements to
encourage such advance concessions would allow those individual
landowners most likely to be the ―cheapest cost avoiders‖20 in future
conflicts to self-identify and commit in advance to yielding.
To bring this idea down to earth, consider recent conflicts that have
arisen between households that wish to grow tall trees and their neighbors
who wish to make use of solar panels.21 Most households do not plan to
occlude the ―solar corridors‖ used by their neighbors, yet they lack any
method or motivation for conveying those intentions to in-movers who are
interested in solar power.22 Such in-movers could, of course, go door to
door in an attempt to negotiate negative easements, but as soon as they raise
the question of buying such a right, the dynamic between the parties
changes in ways that are unlikely to be conducive to a quick and low-cost
resolution. Concerns about this issue have prompted a number of scholars
to consider the use of liability rules that would avoid the need for
individualized pairwise bargains.23 Yet again, such approaches focus on
resolving conflicts that, in an important sense, are already in progress.
Suppose a local government anticipating this issue offered a specified
payment (or, more likely, a property tax reduction) to any household that
agreed to make a solar easement available for later unilateral purchase by a
neighbor at the then-going rate.24 Notice that it would not be necessary for
the governmental entity to actually buy up the easement in advance; rather,
it could acquire an option on the easement and thereby remove the
landowner‘s power to veto a later transaction.25 The local government
to address conflicts, see sources cited in infra notes 43 and 46. See also text accompanying notes 198-199, infra
(discussing role of compulsion in aggregation efforts).
19
Using call and put options to overcome monopoly holdout dynamics is familiar within the scholarly
literature. However, most of the work does not contemplate using these tools before the onset of a disagreement
about uses. An exception is literature considering the advance use of options in the eminent domain context. See
infra note 31 and accompanying text.
20
CALABRESI, supra note 5, at 136-40; see also Christopher Serkin, Existing Uses and the Limits of Land
Use Regulations, 84 NYU L. REV. 1222, 1272 (2009).
21
In California, for example, high profile litigation among neighbors on this issue prompted a legislative
change. See, e.g., Felicity Barringer, Trees Block Solar Panels, and a Feud Ends in U.S. Court, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
7, 2008 (reporting on the dispute and the court‘s judgment); Troy A. Rule, Shadows on the Cathedral: Solar
Access in a Different Light, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 851, 874-75 (describing amendments to California‘s Solar Shade
Control Act); see also Sara C. Bronin, Solar Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1217 (2009) (discussing various approaches
to disputes over solar access).
22
The problem is a general one. As Sterk explains, ―a party unaware of potential competing uses is unlikely
to initiate negotiations to eliminate conflicts[,]‖ leaving it to ―the encroacher or infringer‖ to raise the issue. Sterk,
supra note 11, at 1295.
23
See Rule, supra note 21, at 883-92; Sara C. Bronin, Modern Lights, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 881, 910-14
(2009).
24
The phrase ―then-going rate‖ suppresses a number of complexities that will be discussed below. The basic
idea is simple, however: a landowner would voluntarily expose herself to a liability rule regime.
25
The government‘s original offer amounts to a put option: households have the right, but not the obligation,
to force a sale at the stated price. The subject of this put option—the thing that the government agrees to buy—is a
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could then allow any landowner who wishes to make use of a solar collector
on an adjacent parcel to obtain and exercise the option to acquire the
easement (at the going rate), with proceeds forwarded to the relinquishing
landowner. I will expand on this intuitive example below. For now, it is
sufficient to note how this arrangement might induce those who place a
relatively low value on particular land use entitlements—here, the option to
grow tall trees or erect other tall structures—to step forward and receive
compensation for returning a measure of flexibility to the common pool.26
Involving owners in the process of voluntarily customizing their own
entitlements offers an opportunity similar to that facilitated in the
intellectual property context by Creative Commons licenses, which address
a similar problem and likewise seek to reduce transaction costs.27
Another way to think about this approach is as a mechanism for
countering excessive entrenchment in land use. A large literature on
transition relief, as well as on specific manifestations like compensation for
takings, analyzes the inefficiencies that may follow from shielding owners
from the effects of legal change.28 For example, there is a moral hazard
associated with a just compensation rule that extends to improvements as
well as to the land itself, because people do not bear the full costs of their
investment decisions.29 While much of the work in this vein has focused on
the merits of revamping or eliminating transition relief by fiat, some
scholars have investigated how parties might voluntarily render themselves
more vulnerable to later legal change,30 including through advance sales of
options that constrain later compensation.31 Mechanisms that would allow
call option on a solar easement. See infra Part II.A.
26
To be sure, the flexibility in question is spatially situated and hence not physically collected in an
undifferentiated heap for anyone to draw on for any purpose in any place. Nonetheless, it contributes to a
collective fund of flexibility that makes it easier for people to carry out projects involving land. The idea that
landowners withdraw flexibility from a social fund is suggested in T. Nicolaus Tideman, Integrating Land-Value
Taxation with the Internalization of Spatial Externalities, 66 LAND ECON. 341, 347 (1990).
27
Consistent with this analogy, Creative Commons licenses and similar grants of access to intellectual
property have been described as ―intellectual easements.‖ R. Polk Wagner, Information Wants to Be Free:
Intellectual Property and the Mythologies of Control, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 995, 1032 (2003).
28
See, e.g., DANIEL SHAVIRO, WHEN RULES CHANGE 40-42 (2000); Lawrence Blume & Daniel L.
Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An Economic Analysis, 72 CAL. L. REV. 569, 571-72 (1984); Kaplow,
supra note 6, at 527-28; Jonathan Remy Nash & Richard L. Revesz, Grandfathering and Environmental
Regulation: The Law and Economics of New Source Review, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1677 (2007); Serkin, supra note
20, at 1283-87; see also Jonathan S. Masur & Jonathan Remy Nash, The Institutional Dynamics of Transition
Relief, 85 NYU L. REV. 391 (2010); Jonathan Remy Nash, Allocation and Uncertainty: Strategic Responses to
Environmental Grandfathering, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 809 (2009).
29
See, e.g., Lawrence Blume, Daniel L. Rubinfeld, & Perry Shapiro, The Taking of Land: When Should
Compensation be Paid? 99 Q.J. ECON. 71 (1984); William A. Fischel & Perry Shapiro, Takings, Insurance, and
Michelman: Comments on Economic Interpretations of “Just Compensation” Law, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 269, 27075 (1988); Cooter, supra note 4, at 19-21; see also ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & VICKI L. BEEN, LAND USE
CONTROLS: CASES AND MATERIALS 152-53 (3d ed. 2005) (summarizing the moral hazard problem and collecting
sources).
30
Providing ―transactional flexibility‖ through a menu of governmental alternatives incorporating different
degrees of transition risk represents one such approach. SHAVIRO, supra note 28, at 38-40.
31
See, e.g., Cooter, supra note 4, at 22-23; Fischel & Shapiro, supra note 29, at 274-75. See also Florenz
Plassmann and T. Nicolaus Tideman, Applying Marginal Cost Pricing: Efficiency and Fairness in Takings and
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individuals to force advance sales of selected elements of their ownership
veto powers are a natural extension of these ideas.32
Just as safer automobile design does not eliminate the need for speed
limits, well-designed roads, or liability consequences, neither would
offering landowners greater opportunities to customize their property
entitlements operate as a stand-alone solution. Nonetheless, more flexible
entitlement design could substitute at least sometimes for more costly
precautionary measures, such as blanket bans on particular land uses.
Indeed, a significant advantage of the approach I outline here lies in its
ability to preserve a greater degree of owner autonomy than a system that
depends upon ordinary liability rules to get entitlements out of the hands of
low-valuers and into the hands of high-valuers, or that simply bans larger
and larger sets of uses. Allowing property owners to consummate land use
deals without the interference of a bilateral monopoly dynamic can support
higher levels of voluntary transactions and richer property packages.
The analysis proceeds in three parts. In Part I, I show how analogizing
land use conflicts to accidents, despite some evident differences, yields
useful lessons about the nature of precaution and the alternative paths to
achieving it. Here, I explain how the undue rigidity built into standardized
property entitlements contributes to conflicts and costly efforts at conflict
prevention. Part II examines how precautionary land use entitlements
might work in a variety of contexts, starting with the tree-versus-solar
scenario introduced above. Specifically, I explore how an institutional
alternative—an option exchange—could confront owners with the
opportunity costs of their draws against land use flexibility, and thereby
reduce land use conflicts. Part III considers how a precaution-based
understanding of entitlements fits into ongoing debates about the nature and
meaning of property. Here, I anticipate and counter some objections,
including concerns about the potential inconsistency of increased
entitlement customization with the numerus clausus doctrine.
I. THE COSTS OF LAND USE ACCIDENTS
In The Costs of Accidents, Guido Calabresi pointed out the fallacy of a
single-minded focus on minimizing accidents; the relevant challenge, at
least from an efficiency perspective, is to minimize the sum of accident
Land Assembly, and Accuracy in Assessment, All in One Fell Swoop (2009) available at:
http://works.bepress.com/florenz_plassmann/1 (proposing an alternative that involves an integrated system of selfassessed valuation and compensation for placing property at risk of condemnation that is designed to
simultaneously address the moral hazard problem, the holdout problem, and the problem of insufficiently
deterring governmental takings).
32
This is especially so given that put options have already been recognized as alternatives to traditional
liability rules for the resolution of private land use disputes. See, e.g. Ian Ayres, Protecting Property with Puts, 32
VAL. U. L. REV. 793 (1998).
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costs and prevention costs.33 The same principle holds true in the land use
context.34 Yet most real-world land use controls prohibit uses in a
categorical manner, running up prevention costs with little regard for the
overall goal of cost minimization.35 Efficiency-oriented scholarship on land
use conflicts has, in contrast, focused primarily on what might be termed
―crash management‖—how to most cheaply resolve conflicts that are
already in progress.36 Although a few scholars have given attention to how
entitlement design might influence ex ante choices,37 the full range of
mechanisms through which the likelihood and severity of future conflicts
might be reduced has yet to be examined. Equally important is the
possibility that entitlement design could reduce resort to costly methods of
preventing conflicts ex ante, such as strict separations of uses or outright
prohibitions. This Part will identify and examine the precautionary gap in
existing approaches and explain how attending to the hazards of default
property configurations points toward some alternatives.
A. From Road Accidents to Land Use Collisions
Land use conflicts develop over time and typically lack a dramatic focal
event analogous to tort law‘s paradigmatic car crash. What is more, the
impacts that result from incompatible land uses are rarely ―accidental‖ in
the usual sense; the uses are intended, even if their specific deleterious
effects on neighboring parties are not.38 As an initial matter then, we must
consider how (or even if) a land use conflict is like a collision.
1. The Accident Analogy
The ―crash-like‖ aspects of land use conflicts come down to this: the
costly collision in time and space of two or more socially valuable but

33
CALABRESI, supra note 5, at 26. Administrative costs represent an important subset of the overall costs
that society seeks to minimize. Id. at 28.
34
See, e.g., Ellickson, supra note 5, at 687-91.
35
Both public controls (zoning) and private controls (covenants) may embody these excesses. See, e.g.,
Nicole Stelle Garnett, Unbundling Homeownership: Regional Reforms from the Inside Out, 119 YALE L.J. 1904,
1906 (2010) (―Since local governments (and private developers) can rarely calibrate the level of regulation to
residents‘ true preferences, ex ante prohibitions frequently impose excessive ‗prevention costs.‘‖).
36
See Bebchuk, supra note 11, at 602-03 (observing that most work on entitlements and externalities
approaches the problem from an ex post perspective that ―take[s] as given both the presence of [the conflicting
uses] and their potential costs and benefits from their respective activities‖).
37
See id. at 603 (adopting an ex ante approach that examines how choices about entitlements influences
earlier decisions, such as where to locate, what activities to pursue, and how much to invest in them); text
accompanying notes 49-53, infra (discussing related lines of analysis).
38
Although the term ―intentional‖ can be used in a variety of ways, its doctrinal meaning in the nuisance
context requires only that the defendant carry on an activity known to produce certain effects with substantial
certainty; a specific intention to harm the plaintiff is not required. See, e.g., Morgan v. High Penn Oil Co., 77
S.E.2d 682, 689 (N.C. 1953); Jeff L. Lewin, Comparative Nuisance, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 1009, 1027 (1989).
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incompatible private land use agendas.39 Although classification questions
abound, it is generally helpful to recognize that a given landowner‘s plans
for her property might collide with those of another owner either because
one of the parties undertakes an activity on her parcel that generates a
negative spillover (or withdraws a positive spillover)40 or because one of the
owners exercises a blocking veto power over a property input that, due to its
precise location in space and time, is essential to the other owner‘s plans.
Land use accidents, then, can be thought of as spatially and temporally
sensitive use-thwartings that are produced by the conflicting land use aims
of private parties.41 These thwartings, like the twisted metal and broken
bones that ordinary road accidents produce, are undeniably costly—which
is not to say that they are always worth the cost of avoiding.
The analogy is helpful because it points to gaps in our understanding of
the slate of available precautions. In land use contexts as in road accidents,
ex ante regulations and ex post liability are used in various combinations to
control the primary behavior of the parties, including decisions about when
and where they will be and what they will do while there. Zoning and
covenants further structure how land uses interact, acting in part like
concrete barriers or road blockades to keep uses apart, and in part like
directional signs or lane designations to induce self-sorting.42 But because
land use accidents can be averted by bargains as well as by actions to
separate or regulate uses, an owner‘s decision to make her property
entitlements more amenable to future bargains represents another possible
precaution. In other words, the veto powers landowners retain can be as
hazardous to efficiency as the actions they affirmatively take. Yet little
attention is given to how owners‘ choices about entitlement configuration
and strength—the design of the vehicles in which conflicting property rights
arrive on the scene—might reduce the costs of land use conflicts and their
prevention.
2. Crash Management and Beyond
Many scholars have employed and built upon Calabresi and Melamed‘s
Larissa Katz has developed the idea of owners as ―agenda setters.‖ Larissa Katz, Exclusion and
Exclusivity in Property Law, 58 U. TORONTO L. J. 275, 289-93 (2008). I focus here on private land use agendas
to distinguish conflicts stemming from landowners‘ primary behavior from those produced by the actions of
governments or other collectives. Governmental intervention is often the result of actual or anticipated difficulties
resolving these private conflicts.
40
Whether a particular impact is understood as a negative spillover or the withdrawal of a positive spillover
depends upon societal judgments about the appropriate harm/benefit baseline in use. See Frank I. Michelman,
Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L.
REV. 1165, 1196-1200 (1967).
41
They are therefore distinguishable from the more general-purpose agenda-thwartings caused by factors
like low wealth or governmental prohibitions.
42
See, e.g., LEE ANNE FENNELL, THE UNBOUNDED HOME 41-43, 69-70 (2009) (discussing role of land use
controls in both restricting land uses and inducing self-sorting).
39
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framework to examine how best to assign and protect contested land use
entitlements.43 But as Lucian Bebchuk‘s pathbreaking work emphasizes,
this scholarship has generally approached the efficiency inquiry from an ex
post perspective that takes the existence of the adjacent incompatible uses
as a given.44 Treating a land use dispute as a slow motion wreck highlights
the shortcomings of this approach. We would think it odd to focus all our
attention regarding the costs of road accidents on deciding which party to a
crash should bear the brunt of the impact. Yet the standard economic
approach to land use conflicts does something quite analogous.
To see this point, imagine that a roadway collision could be magically
slowed down by enough orders of magnitude to permit the parties (through
their agents) to resort to the courts after a crash has become inevitable, but
before it has been determined how the in-kind costs of that crash (fatalities,
injuries, and vehicle damage) will be distributed among the parties. The
drivers, let us assume, can still influence that distribution through their
actions in the split-seconds before the crash occurs.45 Suppose the finder of
fact determines that the total amount of damage would be minimized by
having one driver or the other steer her car (nonfatally, let‘s say, but
catastrophically) into an adjacent brick wall rather than plow head-on into
the other party. The court could then choose from Calabresi and Melamed‘s
classic quartet of alternatives by granting either Driver 1 or Driver 2 the
entitlement to continue unscathed (and imposing on her opposite number
the duty to crash into the wall) and by protecting that entitlement with either
a property rule or a liability rule.46 Such an exercise is not incoherent, yet it
Foundational pieces written during the quarter-century following The Cathedral‟s publication include, for
example, Symposium, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: A Twenty-Five Year Retrospective, 106
YALE L.J. 2081 (1997); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic
Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1996); Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal
Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027 (1995); James E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab,
Property Rules and Liability Rules: The Cathedral in Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 440 (1995); Madeline
Morris, The Structure of Entitlements, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 822 (1993); A. Mitchell Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance
Disputes: The Simple Economics of Injunctive and Damage Remedies, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1075 (1980); A.
Mitchell Polinsky, Controlling Externalities and Protecting Entitlements: Property Right, Liability Rule, and TaxSubsidy Approaches, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1979). Numerous more recent works, some of which are cited and
discussed here, have continued to build on the Calabresi and Melamed framework.
44
Bebchuk, supra note 11, at 602-03. As Bebchuk explains, most existing treatments considered the
distribution of value between the parties ex post to be irrelevant to efficiency (even if relevant for other normative
reasons); in fact, the distribution ex post would have important ex ante impacts on efficiency. Id. at 604; see also
Lucian Bebchuck, Ex Ante Investments and Ex Post Externalities, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper
No. 397, http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=297091 (2001) (demonstrating this point formally).
45
There is empirical support for the possibility that choices made in the midst of a crash can influence
within-vehicle patterns of injury and death. See Ilya Beylin et al., Finding Love in the Wreckage: Estimating
Spousal Altruism with Data from Fatal Car Accidents (working paper 2009). That similar choices can affect loss
distributions as between the occupants of different vehicles is memorialized in the lyrics of at least one country
song. Jimmy Martin, Widow Maker, on Jimmy Martin‘s Greatest Hits (King Records, 2004) (ballad recounting a
diesel driver‘s decision to steer his rig into a ditch, with fatal consequences, to avoid colliding with another
vehicle and killing the people therein).
46
The court might also adopt one of the more esoteric alternatives that scholars have devised to force
information—such as decoupled, dual-chooser, or higher-order liability rules. See, e.g., Ronen Avraham,
Modular Liability Rules, 24 INT‘L REV. L. & ECON. 269 (2004); Ian Ayres & Paul M. Goldbart, Optimal
43
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puts the emphasis in the wrong place. It frames the efficiency analysis
solely in terms of getting the entitlement (here, to emerge from the
encounter unscathed) into the hands of the party who valued it most highly,
without regard to the parties‘ earlier actions (such as speeding or driving on
the wrong side of the road) that made the crash inevitable.47 But this is
precisely how the efficient resolution of land use disputes is usually framed.
To be sure, several lines of scholarship have moved beyond mere crash
management. For example, Bebchuk‘s work stresses the impact of ex post
entitlement assignment and protection on ex ante location and activity
choices.48 Closely related are analyses of doctrines like ―coming to the
nuisance‖ that influence future adjacency between incompatible uses.49
Another important strand of the literature addresses the incentive effects of
transition relief, including compensation requirements—issues that Robert
Cooter has incorporated into a larger ―model of precaution.‖50 Other work
has examined how altering components of the property bundle, such as
alienability, can have ex ante effects on acquisition choices.51 The
possibility that entitlement configuration could have repercussions into the
future has also featured in scholarship considering the impact of certain
kinds of fragmentation or alienability-limiting provisions.52 Another
interesting and relevant line of analysis examines how different entitlement
regimes influence the gathering and use of information in managing
conflict.53
Despite these important contributions, property theorists have not yet
fully come to terms with how entitlement design influences the prospects
Delegation and Decoupling in the Design of Liability Rights, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2001); Sergey I. Knysh, Paul
M. Goldbart & Ian Ayres, Instantaneous Liability Rule Auctions: The Continuous Extension of Higher-Order
Liability Rules 48 (Sept. 2004) (unpublished manuscript).
47
Of course, the negligence standard typically applied in tort law regularly fails to examine important sets of
ex ante choices about activity levels. See STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 21-26
(1987). Ideally, we would want people to make efficient choices along all margins, including the choice to be on
the road in that time and place and in that sort of vehicle.
48
Bebchuk, supra note 11.
49
See, e.g., Donald Wittman, First Come, First Served: An Economic Analysis of “Coming to the
Nuisance,” 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 557, 558 (1980); Robert Innes, Coming to the Nuisance: Revising Spur in a Model
of Location Choice, 25 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 286 (2009). Location choice, along with building decisions, might be
understood as a type of ―durable precaution‖ that raises interesting issues about optimal transition policy. See
Steven Shavell, On Optimal Legal Change, Past Behavior, and Grandfathering, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 37, 74-77
(2008) (discussing ―durable precautions‖ and grandfathering in the context of land use).
50
Cooter, supra note 4, at 19-21; see supra note 28 and accompanying text.
51
See, e.g., Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights, 85 COLUM. L. REV.
931, 943 (1985); Lee Anne Fennell, Adjusting Alienability, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1403 (2009).
52
See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1374 (1993); Frank I. Michelman,
Ethics, Economics, and the Law of Property, in NOMOS XXIV: ETHICS, ECONOMICS, AND THE LAW 3, 15-16 (J.
Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1982); Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108
YALE L.J. 1163, 1176-82 (1999).
53
See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1719 (2004) (emphasizing the
role of information in addressing and coordinating conflicting uses and noting that property systems can be set up
with ―access-based‖ rules that place informational and coordination responsibilities on the owner or with ―usebased‖ rules that require officials to gather information); Sterk, supra note 11, at 1288-89, 1295-97 (discussing the
possibility that property rules will induce excessive search).
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and costs of land use conflicts. While scholars have devised increasingly
sophisticated mechanisms for making what amount to intra-crash right-ofway decisions, they have neglected the land use equivalents of crumple
zones, safety glass, brake lights, and turn signals. To see how and why such
features might be added, it is necessary to consider how property currently
works.
B. Property Blocks
―Property blocks‖ (considered both as a noun and as a short declarative
statement) offers a two-word starting point for understanding property and a
springboard for thinking about precautionary entitlement design.
1. Excess Capacity and Crumple Zones
Property law issues owners standardized blocks of monopoly control
that dramatically reduce the choices available to nonowners within a
specified spatial domain. As Henry Smith has emphasized, this
configuration allows owners to choose among a broad range of uses and
activities.54 But it also carries a significant and largely unrecognized cost
that can best be understood as a form of excess capacity55 in the domain of
land use flexibility. Whether measured in terms of space, intensity, or time,
most owners only use a fraction of their property entitlements. For example,
residential owners frequently fail to use the full ―envelope‖56 of airspace
that the prevailing legal regime leaves open to them. Yet owners typically
retain property rule protection over the ownership block in its entirety until
an issue arises—which is to say until a conflict is already in view or in
progress.57
The point is not that property is being underutilized in the ordinary
sense; I am not suggesting it would be optimal for owners to trade their
extra scraps of entitlements with each other until every square inch of space
is being actively used at every moment in time. Rather, the unused portions
54

See generally Smith, supra note 53; see also Part III.B.1
The notion of harnessing ―excess capacity‖ in a variety of contexts through nonmarket sharing rather than
through market transactions is explored in Yochai Benkler, Sharing Nicely: On Shareable Goods and the
Emergence of Sharing as a Modality of Economic Production, 114 YALE L.J. 273 (2004). One of the examples he
discusses involves real property: an owner can share her land with hikers and hunters in some areas by simply not
posting or fencing. Id. at 307-08. In other land use contexts, however, the inability to easily communicate one‘s
intentions combine with a lack of shared norms to require somewhat more formal institutional arrangements. See
supra Part I.B.3 (describing the communications challenges that certain use rights present). This is especially
true where long-run investments by a landowner are at issue that may outlast a given neighbor‘s tenure (or,
perhaps, her inclination toward generosity). See, e.g., Rule, supra note 21, at 853 (noting that it can take twenty
years or more to recoup the cost of solar collectors, even when incentives are offered).
56
For the idea of an owner‘s full set of development rights as an ―envelope‖ or ―three-dimensional mold,‖
see, e.g., ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 29, at 165.
57
See, e.g., Sterk, supra note 11, at 69-74.
55
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of ownership bundles should be viewed as buffers or cushions that, if
identified, could help coordinate land uses, avoid conflicts, and
accommodate changes. In other words, there is plenty of space within
existing property entitlements to build in crumple zones—entitlements that
are engineered in advance to yield to a more highly-valued incompatible
use.
Ordinary liability rules can accomplish this result in theory, but they
may be unsuitable where valuations vary widely among owners, 58 or where
the unilateral transfer of entitlements is deemed normatively undesirable. In
tight-knit communities, norms that eliminate ―hard bargaining‖ may help to
provide the equivalent of such conflict-reducing buffers.59 Other approaches
that rely on an owner‘s obligation towards others might produce similar
results.60 But where shared norms or a consensus about the applicable
obligations are lacking, or where heterogeneous valuations make such
norms or obligations problematic to apply, some other approach is required.
The basic idea pursued here is to elicit advance relinquishments of veto
powers as to superfluous or low-valued components of individual owners‘
property packages.
2. Unsafe at Any Speed: Why Property Is Such a Drag
To illustrate the potential costliness of safety measures, Calabresi
offered the example of cars ―built like tanks‖ that can only go ten miles an
hour.61 While this design configuration would all but eliminate serious road
accidents, it would also largely erase any gains that cars might otherwise
have introduced.62 Contemplating the stickiness in land uses produced by
the combination of hard-edged property rights and categorical land use
controls raises the question of whether we have created a similarly sluggish
and unresponsive system of property in land. The question may at first
seem incoherent. Land is immobile, and property rights are generally
58
See, e.g., Smith, supra note 53, at 1774-81 (noting risks of undercompensation and overcompensation
when liability rules are used).
59
See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 88-89
(1994) (observing that a norm of proportionality in paying for fencing ―sharply truncates the range of permissible
bargaining positions and hence promises to expedite transactions‖); see also Sterk, supra note 12, at 95-96. I
thank John O‘Hara for raising this point.
60
See, e.g., JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, THE EDGES OF THE FIELD: LESSONS ON THE OBLIGATIONS OF
OWNERSHIP 49 (2000) (describing religious obligations to leave the gleanings at the edges of the field open to all
takers); Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 745
(2009) (arguing that property law should – and to some extent does – recognize a social-obligation norm that
promotes ―human flourishing‖); see also Part III B.3 (discussing how an ―abuse of right‖ doctrine treats certain
ways of deploying ownership as inconsistent with owners‘ property packages). In some cases, owners‘
obligations are clear. For example, the doctrine of necessity provides a context in which owners owe duties and
consequently lack certain prerogatives.
61
CALABRESI, supra note 8, at 9. Calabresi also considers the alternative of a ―racing car‖ design that would
nonetheless move at a snail‘s pace, but the ―tank‖ offers a more striking image for present purposes.
62
Id.
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designed to protect expectations and promote stability. On this account, the
very inertia that would be a serious drawback in a product designed to
deliver mobility might seem like an appealing advantage, or possibly the
entire point, of an institution like property.63 Owners‘ veto powers, which
are a function of the property rule protection that generally accompanies
ownership, do a great deal to reduce conflicts and encourage productive
investment.64 Much of the value associated with property rule protection
passes unnoticed as members of society routinely comply with the in rem
duties to ―keep off‖ that the property rights of others impose on them.65
Thus, ownership stops fights over resources before they start and sets the
stage for trade.66
Property can provide these benefits, however, only by drawing from a
limited societal store of spatial and temporal flexibility. By giving owners
the right to refuse transactions, efficient changes in land use can be blocked.
As a result, ownership carries with it an often unacknowledged
externality—spatial rigidity.67 The primary difficulty, as commentators have
noted, is not that elements of the built environment can never be undone
(they can be, at a price), but rather that accompanying legal protections
make change cumbersome and costly.68 Stripping away those protections
presents difficulties of its own, as the controversies surrounding the law‘s
most heavy-handed flexibility restorer, eminent domain, well illustrate.
Significantly, the ossification that property rights introduce into
metropolitan land use systems often exceeds the level of stability that
owners require to pursue their ends. The challenge, then, is to price the
draws that owners make against future land use flexibility without
nullifying the advantages of property itself.

63
Property is generally regarded as an inertial institution. See, e.g., Eduardo M. Peñalver, Land Virtues, 94
CORNELL L. REV. 821, 830-32 (2009).
64
See, e.g., Timothy Besley, Property Rights and Investment Incentives: Theory and Evidence from Ghana,
103 J. POLIT. ECON. 903 (1995); Erica Field, Property Rights and Investment in Urban Slums, 3 J. Eur. Econ.
Assoc. 279, 280 (2005).
65
See, e.g., Merrill & Smith, supra note 4.
66
See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission
Trades and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REV. 129, 131 (1998).
67
See, e.g., Tideman, supra note 26, at 347 (proposing a tax on the right to remain on a given site that would
amount to ―a charge for the diminution of social flexibility that results from putting immobile improvements on
land‖).
68
See E. D‘Arcy & G. Keogh, Towards a Property Market Paradigm of Urban Change, 29 ENVIRON. &
PLANNING A 685 (1997) (observing that while the existing stock of buildings influences urban development, the
property rights bound up in those buildings also constitute ―potentially important constraints on urban change‖);
Julia D. Mahoney, The Illusion of Perpetuity and the Preservation of Privately Owned Lands, 44 NAT. RES. J.
573, 595 (2004) (―Although discussions of the reversibility of land use choices tend to focus on the problems
associated with reconfiguring the physical world, in a number of instances institutional considerations are likely to
prove the greater impediment to undoing decisions involving land.‖). There may be a tendency to overestimate
the permanence of the building stock itself. See Jonathan Hiskes, Cities Get Rebuilt More Often Than You Think,
GRIST, Jan. 22, 2010 (citing prerecession empirical work by Architecture 2030 predicting that ―by the year 2035,
three-quarters of the building stock will be new or renovated‖).
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3. Communication Blocks: Fences and Turn Signals
Property, as Carol Rose has emphasized, is significantly about
communication—hence the widespread use of fences, stakes, and other
markers that are wholly ineffective at physically precluding entry.69
Despite centuries of change and increasing interdependence among land
uses, property has mostly stuck with a simple, gruff message: ―keep off.‖70
This blunt command does a very effective job of avoiding disputes over
who is privileged to be on the land, but does little to coordinate potentially
incompatible uses that do not involve physical invasion.71 Revisiting the
notion of excess capacity will help to clarify. The unused portions of
landowners‘ property envelopes do a poor job of communicating an
owner‘s intentions for the space. Of course, people can consult zoning maps
and recorded covenants to learn how present uses might be expanded
without running afoul of current law, and we can imagine ways to improve
salience of the regulatory information available to the public.72 Yet even
these advances would not tell us the value that the landowner places on
options to use presently unused portions, or whether she stands willing to
sell them.73
69
See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 81-88 (1985)
(examining how property involves communication using a shared language); see also Sterk, supra note 11, at
1315 (noting that ―an owner who marks off property rights provides information to the universe of potential
users‖).
70
See, e.g., Smith, supra note 53, at 1759 (―Typically, things are defined in a rough exclusion-like way, and
this sends a simple message to the world to ‗keep off.‘‖). Of course, property does know how to say a number of
other things (through the use of easements, for example), but it usually lacks any motivation to speak up until an
argument or negotiation is underway.
71
One way that property rules might be thought to reduce conflicts is by inducing anyone interested in a
conflicting use to get in touch with the owner and bargain to a solution. See, e.g., Sterk, supra note 11, at 1295
(―Property rules enable the ‗owner‘ of a resource to serve as a clearinghouse for information about the values
potential users attach to that resource.‖) (citing Smith, supra note 53, at 1728-29); Rose, supra note 69, at 82 (―if
I keep my property claims clear, others will know that they should deal with me directly if they want to use my
property‖). In other words, it might seem unnecessary for property itself to speak if owners can listen. There are
at least two problems, however. First, there may be high search costs in figuring out who owns what in order to
even initiate a bargain. See Sterk, supra note 11, at 1296. Second, the bargaining itself may present a bilateral
monopoly problem. See Sterk, supra note 12, at 58-59. My approach suggests that the owner may be better at
defining the bounds of her own entitlement and worse at being a ―clearinghouse‖ than existing accounts suggest,
which would leave room for gains from delegating the former to the owner but outsourcing the latter to a
collective entity.
72
See Hannah Wiseman, Public Communities, Private Rules, 98 GEO. L.J. 697, 762 (2010) (discussing the
need for better ―visual cues‖ for various types of ―rule-bound communities‖). For example, computer-generated
representations of a home or building‘s property envelope could be incorporated into a GPS-driven application for
a smartphone for on-site viewing. GPS-enabled applications for smartphones already exist that can display nearby
properties for sale and three-dimensional renderings of buildings; new ―augmented reality‖ applications could
layer on additional regulatory information.
73
Note that alienating one‘s option to make use of, say, one‘s airspace is different from selling the airspace
itself to someone else, or even transferring rights to affirmatively use it. Someone might greatly value keeping the
space around and above her home open, but place little value on using the space herself. See STUART BANNER,
WHO OWNS THE SKY? THE STRUGGLE TO CONTROL AIRSPACE FROM THE WRIGHT BROTHERS ON 255 (2008)
(noting this distinction in the context of airplane overflights); see also Troy A. Rule, Airspace in a Green
Economy, 59 UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1782071, draft at 24-25
(discussing rival and nonrival uses of airspace). Affirmative and negative easements (or covenants) allow these
distinctions to be drawn with precision.
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One way that owners could be induced to communicate something
about their plans and valuations would be to apply a ―use it or lose it‖ rule.
But forcing owners to build up and out to the full extent of their property
packages, on pain of losing their right to do so, encourages wasteful and
poorly-timed expansions.74 If the goal is communication, this is like
requiring landowners to communicate through gold-plated billboards. That
the law‘s protection of existing uses provides inducements toward such
costly communication likely represents a significant source of
inefficiency.75 Another possibility would be to presumptively remove an
owner‘s rights under specified circumstances of nonuse but permit a clear
communication to undo that presumption.76 This is one way to understand
the law‘s treatment of easements that arise by operation of law, 77 as well as
adverse possession.78 In certain circumstances, these ―speak up or lose out‖
rules can avoid stripping higher valuers of entitlements while assigning
entitlements in the way that will usually maximize value.79 But such rules
must navigate between becoming traps for the unwary (or inertial or
underlawyered)80 and making the opt-out meaningless as a signal of value.
Simply allowing owners to reserve all manner of rights through a single
communication would do little or nothing to separate high valuers from low
valuers.81
What is missing, then, is a less wasteful way for owners to credibly
communicate their valuations and intentions.82 An option-based approach
that confronts owners with the opportunity costs of holding veto power
offers one alternative.83 Such an approach can serve much the same
74

The analysis here is the same as in other contexts where first-in-time rules produce costly races. See, e.g.,
Wittman, supra note 49; Nash, supra note 28 (explaining how a first-possession rule for grandfathered rights
―creates an incentive for societal actors to engage in a race to capture future resource access, on top of the thenexisting race to capture the resource itself‖); David A. Dana, Natural Preservation and the Race to Develop, 143
U. PA. L. REV. 655 (1995) (discussing incentives for ―property owners to accelerate development in order to avoid
[uncompensated] regulatory losses from future preservation regulation‖).
75
See Serkin, supra note 20, at 1283-86.
76
See Sterk, supra note 12, at 96.
77
See Sterk, supra note 12, at 96 (discussing settings in which the law assumes ―a background duty to
cooperate that can be limited or shed only if the landowner makes the appropriate communications‖).
78
One need not actually use one‘s land to avoid losing it to adverse possession; it is sufficient to monitor the
property and undertake appropriate and timely steps to eject interlopers. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Property
Rules, Liability Rules and Adverse Possession, 79 NW. U. L. REV. 1122, 1130 (1985).
79
For example, Sterk suggests that certain kinds of easements are allowed to arise by operation of law in
order to avoid bilateral monopoly problems, based on the assumption ―[t]hat the right involved is of little value to
the nonresponding landowner.‖ Sterk, supra note 12, at 99 n. 150.
80
Even when opting out is easy, default rules tend to stick. See, e.g., James J. Choi, David Laibson, Brigitte
C. Madrian & Andrew Metrick, Passive Decisions and Potent Defaults, in ANALYSES IN THE ECONOMICS OF
AGING 59 (David A. Wise ed., 2005). Other things equal, the harder it is to learn about and fulfill the opt-out
conditions, the more likely the default rule will fail to reflect the owners‘ true preferences.
81
In other words, the opt-out fails as a signal of value when it is no longer ―costly to fake‖ one‘s status as a
high valuer. See Robert H. Frank, Passions Within Reason 99-102 (1988).
82
The problem of determining relative valuations is a very general one that has received a good deal of
scholarly attention. For a recent survey of several methods for eliciting or inferring valuations, see generally
Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, Identifying Intense Preferences, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1391 (2009).
83
This is the flip side of a permitting approach, which likewise allows a party to choose between cash and an
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function as turn signals or brake lights by providing reliable information
about intentions and thereby facilitating coordination. To appreciate the
gap that it would fill, however, it is necessary to first consider the extent to
which traditional land use controls can serve either as substitutes for this
sort of fine-grained communication, or as communication platforms that
enable people to ―speak with their feet.‖84
C. Land Use Controls as Precautions
While law and economics has focused on ex post entitlement choices,
land use control on the ground has typically employed extensive ex ante
restrictions implemented through zoning and private covenants. Although a
variety of motives drive land use restrictions,85 they are at least sometimes
designed to do exactly what they suggest—prevent conflicts produced by
incompatible adjacent land uses.86 Both public and private land use
controls forestall conflicts largely by separating uses or privileging
particular types of uses;87 the ex ante regulatory regimes that such controls
establish can influence both behavioral and locational choices.88 It might
seem that these controls reshape property entitlements in precisely the
precautionary manner that I am proposing. Private covenants might seem to
hew especially closely to the model of customized entitlements I am
advocating, since these instruments (at least on the most optimistic
interpretation) involve conscious ceding of certain property rights in order
to achieve a more harmonious coexistence with one‘s neighbors. But there
are some important differences that are best illustrated by starting with an
examination of what traditional land use controls do best.
If we were certain that a given type of land use conflict would always be
most efficiently resolved by granting nonowners control over a particular
element of the ownership bundle, then zoning or other forms of collective

option to develop the property in a particular way. See, e.g., Jonathan Remy Nash, Trading Species: A New
Direction for Habitat Trading Programs, 32 COLUM. J. ENVTL L. 1, 11 (2007) (―A permit system allows the
owner to retain a permit and thus retain value even if the owner does not develop immediately in order to
maximize economic efficiency.‖).
84
The idea that citizens ―vote with their feet‖ by selecting among local governments is associated with
Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POLIT. ECON. 416 (1956).
85
See, e.g., William T. Bogart, “What Big Teeth You Have!”: Identifying the Motivations for Exclusionary
Zoning, 30 URBAN STUD. 1669 (1993).
86
See. e.g., Innes, supra note 49, at 288 (describing difficulties in determining efficient initial locations and
observing that ―[t]his inherent problem with ex-post liability/property rules may motivate the use of zoning
powers to regulate ex-ante location decisions.‖).
87
Cumulative (―Euclidian‖) zoning does not actually keep incompatible uses apart so much as it insulates
less intensive uses from more intensive uses; the less intensive uses can still locate in more intensive zones. See
ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 29, at 90-91 (describing how cumulative zoning works).
88
See, e.g., FENNELL, supra note 42, at 123-26 (discussing ―membership effects‖ and ―compliance effects‖);
Michael J. Pogodzinski & Tim R. Sass, The Economic Theory of Zoning: A Critical Review, 66 LAND ECON. 294,
295 (1990) (distinguishing ―direct‖ effects of land use controls from effects on mobility).
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regulation could easily accomplish that result on a wholesale basis.89 An
owner‘s block of property could simply be trimmed back along any number
of dimensions, excising those entitlements that are presumptively more
highly valued by someone else. For example, the law‘s decree that
landowners cannot exclude ordinary aircraft overflights can be
characterized as having truncated the column of airspace that owners were
previously thought to have under the ad coelum doctrine.90 Similar
considerations can explain doctrines and legislation involving ―spite fences‖
and other instances of gratuitously inflicted harm. Here the trimming takes
place along a conceptual line defined by motivations rather than a spatial
dimension, but the curtailment is likewise premised on a judgment that the
owner‘s interests (here, in spiting her neighbor) are decisively outweighed
by the neighbor‘s interest in avoiding a spiteful harm.91
Blanket prohibitions work less well when society is not confident in its
assessment that one conflicting use is (or, for normative reasons should be
treated as) invariably the lower-valued one. It is important not to overstate
this point. First, some generalizing may be in order to conserve on the
administrative costs of running a land use system. Moreover, mechanisms
might be layered onto blanket land use controls to selectively undo certain
restrictions by facilitating bargaining or emulating its results. 92 Even if such
mechanisms fail to develop in ways that provide appropriate tailoring,
across-the-board prohibitions that are highly localized present fewer
concerns, if multiple regulatory regimes within the same general area exist
in sufficient variety to permit sorting.93 Choosing among an array of
communities in which private ownership rights have been whittled away in
various combinations allows for customizing one‘s own entitlement to
remove the less-valued components, in exchange for gaining control over
the less-valued components of other owners.94 Yet even if sorting operated
89
Felix Frankfurter described legislative lawmaking as ―wholesale‖ and judicial as ―retail.‖ Joseph P. Lash,
A Brahmin of the Law, in FROM THE DIARIES OF FELIX FRANKFURTER (1974). The option exchange described
here offers an institutional alternative that permits ―retail‖ adjustments without judicial involvement.
90
For a comprehensive account of how the law regarding overflights developed, see BANNER, supra note
73. In fact, the geometric shape that fits with a strict interpretation of the ad coelum doctrine is not a column but
rather a wedge or cone, given the curvature of the earth. See id. at 17 (―If a man owned what looked like a
circular parcel of land, one American lawyers‘ magazine explained in the 1860s, his true holding was shaped like
a cone, with its apex at the center of the earth and its base at some undefined height.‖).
91
The spiter may, in fact, derive great utility from her aesthetic outburst, but society makes a judgment that
enjoyment of harm caused to others does not count when determining which of two competing valuations society
will privilege. See also infra Part III.B.3 (discussing spite fences in the context of abuse of right).
92
An alternative approach suggested by Michelle White and Donald Wittman is ―zoning-based liability
rules‖ under which ―[p]olluters are allowed to locate in any zone‖ but ―they are strictly liable for damages when
located in the wrong zone, while liability is based on negligence when they are in the right zone.‖ Michelle J.
White & Donald Wittman, Optimal Spatial Location Under Pollution: Liability Rules and Zoning, 10 J. LEGAL
STUD. 249, 266 (1981).
93
See Tiebout, supra note 84. In addition to multiple jurisdictions within metropolitan areas, common
interest communities continue to proliferate, offering ever-expanding opportunities for like-minded households to
group up and fine-tune their property bundles to suit their fancy.
94
Of course, people can‘t always find an ideal community featuring precisely the mix of entitlements that
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well to address heterogeneous valuations (and there is reason to think it may
not)95 traditional land use controls may still fall short in two ways.
First, land use controls do not provide a mechanism for landowners to
transact over future flexibility, before it is needed. Although controls
operate prospectively, they move entitlements around in real time instead of
transferring options to later rearrange entitlements. Even when the more
distant future is expressly contemplated, land use controls typically make
later transactions harder rather than easier—perpetual conservation
easements are a prime example.96 This omission may not seem especially
glaring or important at first; transacting over future flexibility sounds rather
esoteric and alien. But that is only because property arrives in pre-formed
standardized blocks that mask the embedded, low-valued inflexibility that
owners tend to unreflectively consume.97 We ordinarily defer purchasing
things that we do not yet need, and public policy has routinely pushed back
against attempts to monopolize a supply, such as water, that exceeds one‘s
usage.98 Why, then, would we configure property in land to encourage the
opposite approach, by making it difficult for owners to do anything other
than hold monopoly power over low-valued elements or transfer the interest
outright?
Second, traditional land use controls offer ―customization‖ of a fairly
lumpy, off-the-rack variety that applies across an entire neighborhood or
zone. The problem is not just that the restrictions may be ill-fitting for
certain individuals (although this may certainly be the case); it is that the
system as a whole assumes that identical restrictions among neighbors are
complements rather than substitutes. Another way of putting the point is to
observe that collectively applied land use controls demand that payment for
another landowner‘s land use concessions be made in kind through
reciprocal concessions of one‘s own land use rights. While this may be
efficient in a given case, there is reason to suppose that some land use
conflicts are best resolved through different restrictions that apply on
different parcels within an area. New forms of renewable energy are just
one case in point: across-the-board tree restrictions would allow solar power
they most prefer, but perhaps they can do well enough. See, e.g., FRED FOLDVARY, PUBLIC GOODS AND PRIVATE
COMMUNITIES 71 (1994).
95
In earlier work I have considered the shortfalls of sorting, as well as some ways that mechanisms for finetuning land use controls might address valuation heterogeneity. See FENNELL, supra note 42, at 35-38, 67-119.
96
For a critique, see Julia D. Mahoney, Perpetual Restrictions on Land and the Problem of the Future, 88
VA. L. REV. 739 (2002).
97
The metaphorical representation of property as a solid cube corresponding to a square of land may
contribute to this difficulty. See Jeanne Schroeder, Death and Transfiguration: The Myth that the U.C.C. Killed
“Property,” 69 TEMPLE L. REV. 1281, 1339-41 (1996) (proposing the alternative metaphor of liquid to represent
property); Carol M. Rose, Property as the Keystone Right?, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 329, 351 (1996)
(considering how our understanding of property might change if its ―central symbol‖ were water rather than land).
98
See, e.g., Janet C. Neuman, Beneficial Use, Waste, and Forfeiture: The Inefficient Search for Efficiency in
Western Water Use, 28 ENVTL. L. 919 (1998); Sandra Zellmer, The Anti-Speculation Doctrine and Its
Implications for Collaborative Water Management, 8 NEV. L.J. 994 (2008).
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to thrive, but communities might be more pleasant if they incorporated a
workable mix of shade trees and solar power collectors.
Importantly, the entitlement concessions I discuss here need not
represent additional incursions layered on top of traditional land use
controls. Instead, a voluntary system for the advance concession of veto
rights could make it feasible for owners to retain larger sets of entitlements
until a competing use arises, while yet avoiding the fallout from outright
conflict. Just as cars in adjacent lanes need not be strictly separated with
concrete dividers if they can find ways to change lanes without hitting each
other, so too might categorical prohibitory land use controls become less
necessary if other ways of avoiding conflicts were popularized. Notice also
that enabling landowners to effectively return flexibility to the common
pool by ceding veto rights has very different effects on the inertia levels of
the overall property system than does an outright restriction on uses. Where
traditional land use controls ossify, advance concessions of flexibility do the
opposite.
II. PUTTING PRECAUTION INTO PROPERTY
As the discussion above has emphasized, property‘s blocky, inflexible
nature contributes to costly conflicts among land uses. It also heightens the
need to resort to coercive government actions. This Part examines
mechanisms for injecting greater flexibility into property rights over time,
with special attention to the potential use of a local land use option
exchange.99 Such an exchange could lower the costs of land use bargains
between landowners by inducing the precautionary concession of veto
rights over property entitlements. Subpart A illustrates the basic workings
of an option exchange using the example introduced at the beginning of the
paper: a conflict between a neighbor who wishes to grow tall trees and a
neighbor who wishes to use solar panels. Subpart B examines several ways
the idea could be extended and elaborated to address different factual
conditions, including the need to assemble a number of spatially proximate
entitlements. Subpart C considers two refinements that might affect the
feasibility and palatability of the family of approaches discussed here: a
deposit-refund feature, and self-assessed valuation.

99
The idea is similar in concept to a bank, but I use the term exchange to emphasize that those making
deposits and those making withdrawals are often not the same people. The exchange term also helps to distinguish
the ideas here from other conceptually related but distinct institutional alternatives. See, e.g., MITIGATION
BANKING: THEORY AND PRACTICE (Lindell L. Marsh et al., eds. 1996) (edited volume addressing public and
private banking arrangements to accomplish mitigation of harms to wetlands and other habitats); JAMES S.
COLEMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL THEORY 267-69 (1994) (describing an ―action-rights bank‖ into which
people would deposit the right to control a given action, and which would issue shares that could be purchased to
determine the outcome).
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A. A Simple Example: Optioning Sunlight
To see how a precautionary concession of veto rights might work, it is
helpful to start with a simple and concrete example: two neighbors‘
incompatible plans for a solar corridor.
1. Solar Access Versus the Mighty Sequoia
Suppose two neighboring households, the Treetons and the Solshines,
find themselves clashing over solar access.100 The Treetons planted a row of
young sequoia trees ten years ago. A few years later, the Solshines moved
in next door and promptly installed large solar panels along their roof,
which they use to provide power to their home. At that time, the Treetons‘
sequoias were not tall enough to interfere with the Solshines‘ solar
collection. However, the trees have since doubled in height and have begun
to reduce the effectiveness of the Solshines‘ solar panels. Moreover, unless
something is done about the trees, they will keep on growing (their height at
maturity may exceed 200 feet) creating ever-greater interference with the
Solshines‘ sunny plans. The conflict is an interesting one, not least because
it pits two environmentally favored uses against each other.101
There are two obvious ways to avoid this conflict, each of which carries
a serious disadvantage. First, one use could be privileged over the other, at
least within a particular geographic scope. Trees or other structures over a
certain height might simply be banned, or, alternatively, solar power
collectors might be either outlawed or permitted solely at the user‘s risk,
with no recourse for blockages. Such a solution‘s efficiency depends on
planners getting things right, so that each use trumps where, and only
where, it is more valuable than the competing use. Yet even the most
benevolent planners are likely to lack information, and even if they have all
currently available information, they will be uncertain about how things will
play out in the future. A second possibility is to simply make property rights
(here, the rights over the airspace through which sunbeams would travel)
very clear and let parties bargain over them. But, as already discussed, the
transaction costs associated with this possibility are likely to be prohibitive.
Even if the Treetons and the Solshines are the only people involved and
already live next door to each other, they are locked in a bilateral monopoly.
Deciding where to locate based on the unknown plans of multiple other
parties is even more daunting.
It is unsurprising that legal scholars have gravitated toward liability
100
Although I focus on solar access, the same analysis would apply if a view were at stake. Additional types
of conflicts are considered infra in Part II.C.
101
See, e,.g, Barringer, supra note 21 (calling the conflict an ―eco-parable‖ with ―environmental virtue‖ on
both sides of the fence).
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rules in an effort to avoid the twin risks of inflexibility and high transaction
costs.102 Yet ordinary liability rules present difficulties of their own due to
the unilateral nature of the transactions they facilitate. In their standard ―call
option‖ incarnation, a liability rule permits one party to force another to
sell. A ―put option‖ conversely allows one party to force the other to
purchase. Although a put option involves an equally involuntary imposition
on the buyer as the call option places on the seller, the normative cast
changes if we put a governmental entity into the role of forced purchaser.103
While stand-alone governmental put options are certainly possible,104 a
governmental put could be an especially valuable component in an option
exchange that pairs temporally offset sellers and buyers. Such an exchange
could facilitate transactions that are both entirely voluntary and yet free of
the bilateral monopoly dynamic that often afflicts deals between neighbors.
The next section explains.
2. An Option Exchange for Solar Easements
Suppose the fictitious city of Hedgerow is aware that some of its
residents (Type 1) might like to plant tall trees or erect large, permanent
structures, while others (Type 2) might wish to engage in uses that depend
on certain of their neighbors not installing any such foliage or fixtures.105
Each Type contains both those who place a high value on their plans (Types
1H and 2H) and those who place a low value on those plans (Types 1L and
2L). Because the Hedgerowians are an uncommunicative lot, none of them
102

See Rule, supra note 21, at 883-92; Bronin, supra note 23, at 910-14.
As Smith discusses, we do not generally see in rem put options that obligate the public at large to buy
entitlements. Smith, supra note 53, at 1794-95. While there are some narrow instances in which people can be
made to pay for unrequested benefits, these are strictly limited. See, e.g., Smith at 1795; Ariel Porat, Private
Production of Public Goods: Liability for Unrequested Benefits, 108 MICH. L. REV. 189 (2009) (critiquing current
narrow scope of liability for such unrequested benefits). To be sure, a put option written by the government
collectively obligates the populace to engage in the forced purchase; however, the coercion involved is that
ordinarily attending taxation and subject to a different set of political controls than one-on-one forced purchases
would be.
104
The ―Cash for Clunkers‖ program operated by the government in the summer of 2009 offers a recent and
much-critiqued example of a governmental put; motorists could force the government to purchase (for
destruction) specified fuel-inefficient vehicles for a credit against certain new vehicle purchases. See Atif R. Mian
& Amir Sufi, The Effects of Fiscal Stimulus: Evidence from the 2009 “Cash for Clunkers” Program (September
2010) http://ssrn.com/abstract=1670759 (studying the impact of the program). For some other examples, see
Morris, supra note 43, at 854–55 (discussing gun buybacks as puts); John Quiggin, Repurchase of Renewal
Rights: A Policy Option for the National Water Initiative, 50 AUSTRALIAN J. OF AGRICULTURE AND RESOURCE
ECON. 425 (2006) (examining potential for repurchase of certain renewal rights for irrigation licenses); Michael C.
Blumm & Joshua D. Smith, Protecting the Columbia River Gorge: A Twenty-Year Experiment in Land-Use
Federalism, 21 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 201 (2006) (examining the ―opt-out‖ provision for Special Management
Areas, which involved a variation on a put option: during a limited period, landowners subject to SMA regulation
could force the government to either purchase the land at fair market value or release them from the regulations).
105
Assume for purposes of this simple example that the groups are disjoint. Also, my focus is only on the
conflict over solar access, and not on any aesthetic objections that neighbors may have to solar collectors (or, for
that matter, trees). In fact, aesthetic objections to solar power do sometimes lead to prohibitions. See Troy Rule,
Renewable Energy and the Neighbors, UTAH L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) draft available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1649090, at 19.
103
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is aware of the Type to which any other household belongs, nor does the
city of Hedgerow have this information. However, Hedgerow knows that
Types 1H and 2H place a value of $5,000 on being able to carry out their
plans, while Types 1L and 2L place a value of only $500 on the chance to
pursue their rather inchoate intentions.
Hoping to minimize conflict, Hedgerow initially considers offering a
deal to its residents whereby it agrees to buy any household‘s ―build up‖
rights at a price of, say, $600. Note that transferring these ―build up‖ rights
equates to granting a negative easement for light and air (hereinafter, a
―solar easement‖). Alienating a solar easement imposes on the original
owner the duty to keep the airspace clear, but it does not in any way
compromise that original owner‘s ability to keep others from entering the
airspace in question. By offering such a put option, Hedgerow can collect
solar easements from the Type 1Ls and from all the Type 2s. It can then
post a map that shows which households have surrendered these easements
and offer them for sale to 2Hs, whose valuable plans depend on keeping the
airspace clear. Such purchases may not always be possible (some 2Hs will
be surrounded by 1Hs who will not have sold their options), but they may
often be so. More important, 2H‘s who are considering locating in the
neighborhood can examine the map to see which locations would enable
them to acquire the easements necessary to carry out their desired plans.
A major drawback to this approach is that it is very expensive for
Hedgerow to actually buy up all these solar easements and warehouse them
until it can resell them (a time that might never arrive). Fortunately, as
Hedgerow soon realizes, it does not actually have to buy the easements
themselves in order to reduce future conflicts over solar power use; it can
instead buy options to buy the easements. Just as financial futures and
options show us that flexibility over time can be extended to third parties
without actually alienating the underlying asset,106 so too can control over
land use rights be alienated separately from the underlying rights
themselves.107 All that is necessary to break up a later monopoly deadlock is
a unilateral right to purchase. A call option grants the holder the right, but
not the obligation, to acquire the underlying asset (here, the solar easement).
Thus Hedgerow can acquire call options on solar easements that it will
hold for later resale by making a ―flexibility payment‖ that represents only
the option premium, not the value of the underlying easement itself.108
106
For an accessible introduction, see Lester G. Tesler, Futures and Actual Markets: How They Are Related,
59(2.2) J. BUS. S5 (1986).
107
This line of analysis follows literature that casts property ownership as a set of ―real options,‖ including
the option to continue possession and use, to develop, or to redevelop for another use. See, e.g., Laura Quigg,
Optimal Land Development, in REAL OPTIONS IN CAPITAL INVESTMENT: MODELS, STRATEGIES, AND
APPLICATIONS 265 (Lenos Trigeorgis ed., 1995). Once these options are identified as separate repositories of
value, the possibility emerges that control over them might be alienated to third parties.
108
More precisely, Hedgerow would give residents a put option that would enable those residents to force a
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Suppose a Type 1L landowner, Wunnell, takes Hedgerow‘s offer, and, in
exchange for a small lump of cash, alienates a call option on her solar
easement. All Wunnell has transferred is a call option granting the holder
the right (but not the obligation) to engage in a later transaction to buy the
easement at the going strike price (more on that shortly). Wunnell continues
to hold ―build-up‖ rights109 until such time as someone—the city or a later
buyer—exercises the call option and actually acquires the solar easement.
However, any building-up that Wunnell does will be at her own risk (or
pursuant to private insurance arrangements); if the call option is later
exercised, Wunnell will be duty-bound to clear the solar path and keep it
unobstructed. Alternatively, Wunnell can undo the deal by repurchasing the
option before its exercise, subject to certain limits.110
Using the option format requires establishing not only an option price
(the amount the government pays to acquire an option on Wunnell‘s solar
easement) but also a strike price (the amount that a household purchasing a
solar easement option would have to pay to acquire the easement itself).
Pricing constitutes one of the most challenging aspects of this approach, and
I will take it up in some detail in subpart B, below. For now, it is sufficient
to suggest that some algorithm would be established for determining the
―going rate‖ in a given area at regular intervals, and that this rate would
determine the option‘s strike price.111 A Type 2H owner (call him
Tooaytch), would first acquire the solar easement option on Wunnell‘s
property from the local government‘s option exchange. This would give
Tooaytch the right, but not the obligation, to pay the current strike price
(within some limited exercise period) and thereby acquire Wunnell‘s solar
easement.112
Although there are a number of moving parts, the core idea is very
simple: providing an institutional platform that allows households to
voluntarily downgrade certain property entitlements (ones that they do not
value very highly) from property rule protection to liability rule protection.
In other words, owners are presented with the opportunity cost of holding
veto power over entitlements, and thereby encouraged to delink the veto
power for low-valued entitlements from the entitlements themselves.
Figure 1 summarizes the structure of the situation as it unfolds over time for
the various players, using the example outlined above.113
sale of a call option on their solar easements. For discussion of pricing, see infra Part II.B.2.
109
While Wunnell still owns the legal interest (even with a call option on it outstanding), it is technically not
(yet) an easement. See, e.g., Van Sandt v. Royster, 83 P.2d 698, 700 (Kansas 1938) (stating the rule that one
cannot own an easement on one‘s own land).
110
See infra Part II.B.3.
111
See Kades, supra note 6, at 1255-56 (discussing ―floating options‖).
112
Option sales and resales would need to be limited in ways that would avoid creating new monopoly
problems, whether through eligibility requirements that would constrain the pool of purchasers, or through
alienability limits that would accomplish the same result indirectly. See text accompanying notes 156-158, infra.
113
For completeness, I have included Types 2L and 1H in the chart, even though they are not directly
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Figure 1:
Hedgerow’s Option Exchange in Action (An Example)
Time
Player
City of
Hedgerow

Type 1H
(High
Valuer of
Build-Up
Rights)
Wunnell
[Type 1L]
(Low
Valuer of
Build-Up
Rights)

Time 0

Time 1

Time 2

Offers a deal
(put option):

Sells call option
acquired from 1L to
2H. The strike price is
set at the then-going
rate, and the exercise
period is limited.

When 2H exercises
the call option, serves
as an intermediary in
transferring the
easement and
forwarding payment.

We‘ll pay $$ for a
call option on a
solar easement
across your land.
Refuses deal;
retains full
property rule
control114 over
rights to plant and
build.
Takes deal.

Plants trees to her Enjoys trees, avoids
heart‘s content.
stressful interactions
with solar-power
enthusiasts.

Plants or builds at her
own risk (or pursuant
to private insurance
arrangements).

When call option for
solar easement is
exercised by 2H,
receives the strike
price and loses the
easement.
Buys and exercises
the solar easement
call option Hedgerow
acquired from 1L.
Installs massive solar
panels; enjoys solar
power free of
interference.
Admires neighbor‘s
solar panels. May
become a 2H in time.

Tooaytch
[Type 2H]
(High
Valuer of
Solar
Access)

Takes deal.

Searches Hedgerow‘s
solar easement call
option exchange,
locates a clear solar
path across 1L‘s land,
and buys the option.

Type 2L
(Low
Valuer of
Solar
Access)

Takes deal.

Has no desire to build
and is not currently
motivated to seek a
solar easement; just
enjoys the extra cash.

involved in the primary transaction examined in this example.
114
This property rule control is not absolute, as property remains subject to the risk of later regulatory
change, as well as to the possibility of eminent domain. See text accompanying notes 166-168.
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3. Why Do It That Way?
This example, simplified as it is, might already seem unduly complex.
Because any model of precaution must pay attention to administrative costs
as well as accident costs and prevention costs, it is worth asking whether an
option exchange‘s unfamiliar and somewhat elaborate structure adds
anything useful to garden variety liability rules.115 It might seem easier, for
example, for Hedgerow to simply declare that no tall trees or buildings are
allowed and let the serious tree lovers (Type 1Hs) buy their way out of that
restriction.116 As a response to a static situation in which the neighbors are
already in place and their preferences are fixed, such a ―pay to build‖
regime looks appealing. Recognizing the conflict as one that unfolds over
time, however, shows how the option exchange arrangement just described
might dominate.
Suppose that in 2000 nearly all households are would-be builders or
tree-growers (Type 1s). However, most of them are Type 1Ls with only a
vague sense that they might someday wish to use their airspace. Slapping a
―no building up‖ rule on the population at this stage is hardly a politically
popular move, nor does it seem particularly necessary. The ―pay to build‖
provision, far from mitigating opposition to the rule change, would
probably be viewed as yet another attempt on the part of local government
to ―mint‖ its own money.117 Even putting political feasibility aside,
however, consider how a ―pay to build‖ scheme would operate over time as
more solar-power enthusiasts (Type 2s) enter the population and
preferences among both Type 1s and Type 2s grow more intense. Type 2s
would immediately see that ―pay to build‖ undermines their ability to move
forward with their plans with any confidence. After Tooaytch makes a large
investment in solar power, for example, a neighboring family might
suddenly buy build-up rights.
There are a few ways to address this concern, but each introduces
difficulties. One possibility is to channel the money collected from the ―pay
to build‖ buyout to any Type 2s whose plans are disrupted as a result. This
will predictably cause Type 2s to pay little attention to avoiding conflict,
and, indeed, some Type 2Ls might even find it profitable to court conflict in
the hope of getting a payout in excess of their own valuations. The moral
115

See text accompanying note 23, supra.
Alternatively, Hedgerow could start with a default rule of no right to solar access, but let solar enthusiasts
(Type 2Hs) obtain easements and enjoin blockages thereof for a fee. See Rule, supra note 21, at 891-92
(describing Iowa‘s solar access regime, which adopts roughly this approach). This, too, would be a garden variety
liability rule, although one corresponding to the rarer ―Rule 4‖ subspecies in Calabresi and Melamed‘s
framework. See id. at 860 fig. A, 891-92.
117
Jerold S. Kayden, Zoning for Dollars: New Rules For an Old Game? Comments On the Municipal Art
Society and Nollan Cases, 39 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 3, 3 (1991).
116
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hazard problem could be limited by making compensation invariant to the
Type 2s actual investments,118 but an invariant payment gives Type 1Hs no
incentive to identify themselves promptly, before costly investments are
made.119 Another possibility is to impose a sunset on the ―pay to build‖
option, either by making it available only during a limited time frame or by
cutting it off whenever a neighbor begins engaging in a conflicting use. But
the former is ill-suited to changes over time that might cause new 1Hs to
emerge, while the latter would encourage the kinds of wasteful
communication discussed earlier, as owners race to truncate the rights of
their neighbors.
Why does the option exchange described above perform better?
Certainly we can say it would be more politically palatable simply because
money is initially flowing in a different direction—towards those who
voluntarily surrender their rights rather than away from those who want to
retain their rights. But that is hardly a reasoned basis for preferring the put
option structure; indeed, as we will see, the upfront cost involved presents
an important obstacle to be overcome. The real advantage of the option
exchange lies in its ability to distinguish between two sets of people who
are observationally equivalent under the ―pay to build‖ alternative: those
who do not value the build-up right in excess of the price set for it, and
those who do value the build-up right in excess of the fee but, for various
reasons, prefer to wait before exercising it. Some of the tactics discussed
above (sunsets, estoppel) do offer ways to shrink the second group, but at
significant cost.
Now compare the option exchange. Here, Hedgerow starts by extending
a put option: offering to buy up call options on solar easements. While it is
true that we cannot tell whether those who have not yet exercised this initial
put option will do so at some point in the future, this is less of a problem in
terms of coordinating uses going forward. Recall, exercising the put option
means relinquishing part of one‘s property package (the veto over alienation
of build-up rights), not augmenting the package. Thus, while more people
may exercise the put option in the future, that will only reduce the prospect
of conflict, not heighten it. Those who have already exercised their put
options have alienated along with it unlimited freedom to change their
minds. Certainly we can structure the option exchange system to permit
landowners who have alienated a call option on a solar easement across
118
Cf. Cooter, supra note 4, at 14-15 (explaining how liquidated damages, which are invariant to actual
harm, maintain incentives for the nonbreaching party in contract).
119
The payment and compensation components could be decoupled, charging 1s based on actual costs to 2s,
but giving 2s only the invariant lump. Cf. Plassmann & Tideman, supra note 31 (proposing a similarly decoupled
approach – one in which the invariant lump is based on a self-assessed value – to align incentives in the eminent
domain context). But if the objection to the option exchange arrangement is its complexity, this would not
necessarily represent a simplification. It would also presumably be politically difficult to deny full compensation
to harmed 2s when the government is collecting it from 1s.
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their land to buy back that option before it is exercised by a third party.120
But a third party contemplating buying an option would know that once she
does so, she can complete a unilateral purchase of the underlying
entitlement during the exercise period. This is different from the estoppel
provision contemplated above in that the third party buying the entitlement
(here, a Type 2 who wishes to engage in solar collection) need not engage
in the use itself in order to extinguish the conflicting claim of the other
party. Rather, she need only buy an option on the underlying entitlement,
which has been voluntarily placed in a pool for purchase.121
There are other advantages to the specific option exchange format
contemplated here122 that might hold significance in specific contexts or
under particular evaluative frameworks. By making the default rule one in
which the landowner retains a given right, claims of involuntary
confiscation of property, and associated intrusions on autonomy, are
minimized. It is true that the system effectively imposes a fee on those who
hold onto all their rights,123 but this kind of interference with monetary
value is typically viewed as standing on a different footing from a direct
interference with the prerogatives of ownership.124 The option exchange
thus interjects flexibility into a property system without requiring more
regulation while at the same time avoiding the political pushback that might
accompany the explicit sale of zoning rights. A ―pay to build‖ alternative
120
Part II.B.3, infra, discusses how buyback transactions might be handled, as well as limits that might be
imposed to avoid strategic buybacks.
121
Again, we could add features to the ―pay to build‖ option that would cut off the chance to exercise the
option upon sufficient payments from a third party interested in exercising inconsistent rights. But to create the
structure for managing these payments would require an institutional platform no less complex than the option
exchange itself.
122
The discussion above presented only one of many possible ways of structuring an institutional platform
for pairing buyers and sellers of options. Calabresi and Melamed‘s work and the large body of literature building
on it emphasize that there is always a flip side of any arrangement, a Rule 4 for every Rule 2, a call for every put.
See, e.g., Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 3; Ayres, supra note 32; see also Saul Levmore, Carrots and Torts, in
CHICAGO LECTURES IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 203 (Eric A. Posner ed., 2000). Options might also be nested,
sequenced, decoupled, and combined in any number of ways. See, e.g., sources cited in supra note 42. Although
space does not permit cataloguing how all these alternatives might be incorporated into an option exchange
format, one differently structured alternative is discussed below in Part II.C.2 (describing how parties might
voluntarily alienate options of the ―pay me to stand it‖ variety). Optioning one‘s power to engage in an
affirmative use, as in the solar easement example presented here, produces a voluntary Rule 4 regime (in which a
third party can pay to stop a use), while optioning the power to stop someone else‘s use creates a Rule 2 regime
(in which a third party would pay to continue the use). See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 3; Rule, supra note
21, at 891-92. I thank Ariel Porat for conversations on these points.
123
Even though framed as a put option that pays a subsidy for relinquishing rights, the system amounts to a
tax on those who fail to relinquish rights, assuming that the subsidies would be funded by property owners
generally. For more on funding alternatives, see Part II.B.1, infra.
124
Amnon Lehavi, The Taking/Taxing Taxonomy, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1235, 1238 (2010) (emphasizing the
law‘s differential treatment of governmental acts that reduce value and those that interfere with exclusion or other
core property rights); Richard A. Epstein, The Seven Deadly Sins of Takings Law: The Dissents in Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 955, 957-59 (1993) (criticizing this distinction in takings law);
see also Armen A. Alchian, Property Rights, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS (Steven N.
Durlauf
&
Lawrence
E.
Blume,
eds.)
(2d.
ed.
2008)
online
at
http://www.dictionaryofeconomics.com/article?id=pde2008_P000226 (―It is important to note that it is the
physical use and condition of a good that are protected from the action of others [by private property rights], not
its exchange value.‖).
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would combine these two elements by adding alienable regulations. As a
result, it could be expected to elicit opposition both from property rights
advocates and from those opposed to allowing people to buy their way out
of land use restrictions.125
B. Money and Uncertainty
Despite its attractive features, an option exchange must confront a
number of foundational problems involving the movement of cash among
the players over time and under conditions of uncertainty. First, writing put
options for the populace—even if what the governmental entity offers to
buy is itself only an option—requires some source of funding. Second is
the knotty issue of setting prices.126 Third are a set of issues involving how,
when, and at what price resales or reversals of the original transaction can
be accomplished. Without purporting to provide a detailed operational
blueprint, the sections below take up these questions.
1. Deposit-Refund Systems
The option premiums (―flexibility payments‖) offered to households
who surrender veto power could be funded in a variety of ways, each with
particular distributive and incentive effects. The challenge is to devise a
funding approach that is consistent with the overall goal of minimizing total
accident costs. Here it is helpful to revisit the idea that property ownership
draws against a stock of spatial and temporal flexibility by granting owners
a set of veto rights. Deposit-refund systems, of which bottle bills are a
familiar example, suggest an interesting possibility: 127 owners might be
charged a ―flexibility tax‖ that could then be rebated in part as portions of
the property bundle are optioned.128
125
Cf. Wallace E. Oates, From Research to Policy: The Case of Environmental Economics, 2000 U. ILL. L.
REV. 135 (2000) (recounting how opposition to market-oriented pollution controls came both from those who
believed entitlements to emit should not be sold and from those who resisted additional restrictions on their
activities); Carol M. Rose, From H2O to CO2: Lessons of Water Rights for Carbon Trading, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 91,
109-10 (2008) (observing that ―the history of American water institutions suggests that cap-and-trade regimes are
likely to be subject to moral objections from two almost diametrically opposed sources: a pro-development
argument that any resource cap is immoral so long as there are still mouths to be fed; and a pro-environmental
charge that it is immoral to trade away one‘s bad actions‖).
126
This issue is not unique to the option exchange format, however; even a simple ―pay to build‖ regime
would require setting a price for exceeding the specified height.
127
Independent work by Robert M. Solow and Edwin S. Mills laid the intellectual foundations for this
approach. See Robert M. Solow, The Economist‟s Approach to Pollution and Its Control, 173 SCIENCE n.s. 498
(Aug. 6, 1971); EDWIN S. MILLS, URBAN ECONOMICS 259-60 (1972); see also PETER BOHM, DEPOSIT-REFUND
SYSTEMS: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS TO ENVIRONMENTAL, CONSERVATION, AND CONSUMER POLICY (1981);
Don Fullerton & Ann Wolverton, Two Generalizations of A Deposit Refund System, NBER Working Paper No.
7505 (2000), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w7505.
128
Although it takes a somewhat different tack, Nicolaus Tideman‘s work relates very closely to the issues I
discuss here, both in terms of identifying and characterizing problems and in proposing mechanisms for
addressing them. See Tideman, supra note 26, at 347 (noting imposition on flexibility that immobile
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Spelling out the analogy to deposit-refund systems will help to illustrate
some of the advantages of this approach. If it is costly to follow people
around after they buy a bottled drink to determine whether they dispose of
the bottle carefully or carelessly (and fine them in the latter case), an initial
fee or tax equal to the damage that improper bottle disposal would inflict
can be charged at the time of purchase.129 This fee is paired with a later put
option—the ability to force the sale of the empty bottle back to a designated
facility at a fixed price. The surrendered bottle proves that one has not, in
fact, inflicted the feared damage on society.130 The net result of the
combined deposit and refund is a tax on improper disposal.131
Economists have explored the use of ―environmental bonds‖ or other
generalizations of the deposit-refund idea to refine incentives over time and
under conditions of uncertainty.132 The idea is the same as in the bottle bill
context: entities whose acts may inflict harms on society post bonds that
will later be refundable in whole or in part upon a showing that the feared
harm has not come to pass. Instead of presenting an empty bottle as proof
that harm has not been inflicted, the entity might use other forms of proof to
establish facts about the state of the world.133 Although this way of
approaching uncertain future impacts has been neglected in the legal
literature, it could have significant traction in the land use setting.
Like bottles, landowners‘ entitlements can be disposed of in more or
improvements present and recommending a tax system to address it); id. at 348 (exploring the possibility of using
a land rent system to price both positive and negative spatial externalities); id. at 346 (suggesting a bond system to
cover the costs of later abandonment); id. at 347 (explaining how ―unsubdivided land‖ might be analogized to ―an
exhaustible natural resource such as oil‖). In recent work, he and Florenz Plassmann have examined how a bond
requirement could address uncertainty about the magnitude of externalities. See T. Nicolaus Tideman & Florenz
Plassmann, Pricing Externalities, 26 EUR. J. POLIT. ECON. 176 (2010).
129
See Robert Costanza & Charles Perrings, A Flexible Assurance Bonding System for Improved
Environmental Management, 2 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 57, 59 (1990) .
130
The system thus switches the burden of proof to the bottle purchaser. See id. at 59, 65.
131
See, e.g., Fullerton & Wolverton, supra note 127, at 2 (―This ‗two-part instrument‘ is equivalent to a
Pigovian tax on the ‗dirty‘ activity‖). This assumes that there are only two disposal choices, proper and improper.
In fact, there are better and worse ways of disposing of bottles that are not turned in, and in some cases bottles that
were not surrendered may have been put to another productive use (for example, as an input to a craft project).
This overbreadth problem turns out to be less of a concern in the property context. Whereas in the bottle deposit
context, the physical bottle merely proxies (imperfectly) for not having conducted an improper disposal, the
surrendered flexibility in the land use context is valuable in itself, and costly (though often cost-justified) when
retained.
132
See, e.g., Costanza & Perrings, supra note 129; Charles Perrings, Environmental Bonds and
Environmental Research in Innovative Activities, 1 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 95 (1989); Ronnie Horesh, Better than
Kyoto: Climate Stability Bonds, 22(3) ECON. AFFAIRS 48 (2002). For a recent overview of the literature and some
variations on the deposit-refund theme, see Angelo Antoci, Environmental Options and Technological Innovation:
An Evolutionary Game Model, FEEM Working Paper No. 90.2009 (November 2009)
available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1515701. For a discussion of some difficulties with this approach, see Loredana Torsello
& Alessandro Vercilli, Environmental Bonds: A Critical Assessment in SUSTAINABILITY: DYNAMICS AND
UNCERTAINTY (Graciela Chichilnisky et al., eds, 1998).
133
See, e.g., Costanza & Perrings, supra note 129, at 65-66. The same idea can be applied to encourage
social improvements; bonds can be issued that will pay off when particular social goals are met or particular,
measurable conditions obtain (ones that the bondholders have some capacity to influence). Ronnie Horesh,
Injecting Incentives Into the Solution of Social Problems: Social Policy Bonds 20(3) ECON. AFFAIRS (2000) It is
even possible to issue bonds that give two different groups or entities different sides of the same bet regarding the
future state of the world. See Antoci, supra note 132.
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less costly ways. For example, they can be used as a source of monopoly
leverage or they can be surrendered to a higher valuing user in a low-cost
bargain. Examining the situation ex post, we cannot tell whether a
particular landowner who refuses to sell some element of her holding is
exercising a blocking power over a low-valued right, or is using her veto
power as owner to retain a high-valued right.134 Providing a mechanism for
advance surrender of the blocking power can help to differentiate between
high- and low-valuing owners. Low-valuing owners would still be free to
hold onto their veto rights in the hope of later using them strategically, but
this tendency would be cabined in two ways. First, they would forgo a
payment in doing so, which raises the opportunity cost of making that
choice. Second, the expected return from strategic behavior would be likely
to drop once it becomes easier for parties to make location decisions that
take into account the amenability of the neighbors to their planned uses.
To be clear, I am not suggesting that there is anything morally
blameworthy or suspect about an owner wanting to retain veto rights over
portions of her property package for which she has no current or pending
plans. My point is only that this retention of rights (like every other
instance of ownership) amounts to a sustained draw against a limited stock
of flexibility, and should be priced as such. The deposit-refund notion is
helpful in that it can deal relatively well with externalities whose
magnitudes are unknown. We can be sure that, in the aggregate, large
quantities of privately held property rights have an inertial effect, but we
cannot know exactly how or when particular plans will be thwarted. Taking
an advance payment135 that acknowledges the potential of ownership‘s
prerogatives to ossify the built environment provides a mechanism for
selectively providing incentives for flexibility from that same fund as the
need arises. This approach may strike some readers as insufficiently
protective of property rights. In fact, it is likely to be far more protective of
private property rights if it succeeds in allowing purchased private
flexibility, surrendered voluntarily, to substitute for across-the-board
transfers of rights from private parties to collectives.
2. Valuation and Pricing
A full analysis of how land use options might be structured and priced is
beyond the scope of this essay, but a few observations on valuation and
pricing are in order. As a threshold matter, it is important to keep straight
134
In other words, we cannot tell whether someone is acting as a (strategic) holdout or an (honest) ―holdin.‖
See Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Selling Mayberry: Communities and Individuals in Law and
Economics, 92 CAL. L. REV. 75, 128–29 (2004).
135
Given that the externality in this case flows from continuing to hold an owner‘s veto, payment would be
assessed annually or at other regular intervals. See infra note 143 and accompanying text.
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several different moving parts: (a) an initial tax or deposit collected from
property owners that reflects the potential interference with future flexibility
of their veto rights; (b) a flexibility premium offered to landowners for the
sale of call options on certain entitlements (technically, the strike price on a
put option written by the governmental entity); (c) the price at which other
landowners can acquire those call options (the option price for the call
option); and (d) the price at which those other landowners can exercise the
option to actually acquire the entitlement (the strike price for the call
option).
The last element, the strike price at which the entitlement is actually
transferred, offers a natural starting point for analysis. Even if particular
land use entitlements are not frequently bought and sold on the open
market, it may be possible to develop a measure for valuing these elements
using a hedonic pricing method.136 In particular contexts, other possibilities
may exist as well. For example, solar energy produces energy savings that
are quantifiable, making it possible to tie the strike price for exercising a
solar easement option to, say, the average energy cost savings achieved by
all landowners within a given category (such as residential single-family
households on lots less than one acre).137 This figure would change over
time but could be determined at any given time using an agreed-upon index.
The original owner in the story would, after selling this option, hold an
entitlement subject to an index-priced option or ―ESIPO.‖138
Keying the price to an element relevant to the purchaser‟s valuation
might seem exactly backwards, since it would mean that transactions could
occur more easily when the easement becomes less valuable in the
purchaser‘s hands. But if a fixed lower bound for the strike price were set
using this same method at the time the option were initially conveyed, we
could be certain that options would only be ―in the money‖ when the value
to the purchaser exceeded the price that the seller initially found sufficient.
Allowing the exercise price to then float upward when (but only when) it
starts to become more valuable to others would help to overcome what is
likely to be the largest resistance point to transferring the option: the
opportunity cost of giving up the chance to later bargain over a larger
surplus.139
136
For discussion of the hedonic market analysis, see, for example, JONATHAN GRUBER, PUBLIC FINANCE
PUBLIC POLICY 202 (2005). See also Jonathan Remy Nash, Mark to Ecosystem Service Market: Repricing
Conservation Easements to Protect Ecosystems, in REBUILDING THE ARK: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON ESA REFORM
(Jonathan H. Adler ed., forthcoming 2011) (discussing alternative valuation methods for conservation easements).
137
It would also be necessary to select a time horizon over which the energy savings should be calculated, as
well as decide whether special financing should be made available to purchasers to address liquidity issues.
138
Cf. Carol M. Rose, The Shadow of The Cathedral, 106 YALE L.J. 2175, 2179 (1997) (observing that a
liability rule creates a ―property right subject to an option (or easement)‖ — that is, a ―PRSTO (or PRSTE)‖).
139
This analysis does not turn on whether the valuation of the original owner is actually correlated with that
of the easement acquirer, nor on how or whether correlated values relate to the choice between property rules and
liability rules. For discussion of those issues, see generally Ian Ayres & Paul Goldbart, Correlated Values in the

AND
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ESIPOs are not the only pricing alternative available, however. Another
approach would allow the original owners to set the prices at which options
could later be exercised—what I have elsewhere termed entitlements
subject to self-made options, or ―ESSMOs.‖140 ESSMOs offer a great deal
of flexibility where valuations vary widely and contain significant
subjective components. Administering them adds a few additional wrinkles,
however—notably the need to adjust the price of the option itself to reflect
the selected strike price. For example, the government would not want to
pay the same flexibility premium to a household that set a price for its solar
easement at $1 million as it would to a household that set a price of $100.
One possibility would be a sliding scale or menu of strike prices for the call
option (element (d) above) integrated with a corresponding list of flexibility
premiums (element (b)).
Consider next factor (a), the initial tax or fee on ownership‘s
inflexibility. One benchmark might be the ―settlement costs‖ of
condemnation,141 plus the expected costs of preparing the property for a
new use: the costs of paying compensation for, and then tearing down and
hauling away, any improvements added to the land that cannot be
repurposed.142 Suitable adjustments could then be made for factors that
increase the likely need for condemnation, such as especially strategic
placement, excessively small lot sizes (making reassembly more difficult),
and so on.143 While an owner‘s inflexibility may lead to many outcomes
other than condemnation, including additional land use regulation that does
not require payment of just compensation, condemnation remains an
available last resort that helps to set the outer bounds of the potential
interference that ownership of the entire property block produces. The
point of the fee is not, of course, to pre-fund the expanded use of eminent
domain, but rather to collect for an externality produced by ownership and,
by pricing it, reduce the tendency to hang onto the sorts of unnecessary
rights that make eminent domain (and other coercive interventions) more
likely.
Theory of Property and Liability Rules 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 121 (2003) and Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 43.
Rather, the approach here is driven by the owner‘s opportunity costs of transforming a property rule entitlement
into an entitlement protected only by a liability rule, where part of the package that attends the former is the
ability to try to capture a share of any later bargaining surplus.
140
See Lee Anne Fennell, Revealing Options, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1399, 1433-44 (2005) (describing
ESSMOs and reviewing antecedent literature taking similar approaches).
141
See Michelman, supra note 39, at 1214-15 (defining ―settlement costs‖ as the ―dollar value of the time,
effort, and resources which would be required in order to reach compensation settlements adequate to avoid
demoralization costs‖). The actual fair market value of the property that would be obtained or transferred through
eminent domain is not part of these settlement costs.
142
On the advance payment of a destruction fee, see Tideman, supra note 26, at 346. The destruction fee
also relates to the abandonment point raised infra, Part II.C.3.
143
Cf. Tideman, supra note 26, at 347 (proposing an annual tax based on the self-assessed value of
improvements to account for the social loss of flexibility associated with remaining on a given site). Tideman
contemplates that such a tax would work in conjunction with a system in which owners pay the rental value of the
land to the government. See id. at 342-47.
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The deposit-refund literature suggests choosing a high estimate of likely
future damage (here, from inflexibility) where significant uncertainty exists.
If later information reveals that the initial estimate of damage is too high,
rebates can be made across the board to property owners.144 In this context,
such a readjustment might be triggered by changes in demand for urban and
suburban land within a given jurisdiction due to exogenous changes in the
costs or benefits of physical agglomeration, or by other technological
changes (such as virtual reality advances) that make the acts of neighbors
less consequential or the need for redevelopment less pressing. Even in the
absence of governmental adjustments of initial estimates, insurance
companies could step in with actuarially determined estimates, paying the
flexibility tax on behalf of their customers in exchange for a premium and
the assignment of all later rebates.145
Finally, it is necessary to consider the pricing of the option on, say, the
solar easement—both when it is initially transferred to the government‘s
option exchange, and when it is later transferred to a third party (such as a
neighbor).146 The amount the government offers to households that sell a
call option on an entitlement with strike price (d) amounts to a partial rebate
on (a) that, like a bottle deposit refund, is based on the owner‘s softening of
inflexibility. As such, it should be selectively priced based on the harm that
a given type of inflexibility is causing. The government then acts as a
broker or middleman in reselling the call option to other households at price
(c), which would reflect an administrative increment as well as the
constrained length of the option period that is extended to third parties.147
Lurking in the background of all this pricing is the fact that the
adjustments being made through options might also be made, at least in
many cases, through regulatory action without any compensation at all.
This presents some complications, but it also helps to provide a relevant
baseline for evaluating how even very imperfectly priced options might
perform. However rough and approximate the pricing might be, any
separation that options achieve between high and low valuing entitlement
holders will improve precision over an across-the-board regulatory
approach.
3. Reacquisitions and Resales

144

See, e.g., Costanza & Perrings, supra note 129, at 66.
See BOHM, supra note 127, at 86-89.
There could be non-neighbor third party intermediaries who purchase and resell options, although these
sales would have to be subject to limits on resale that are consistent with the goals of the option exchange. For
example, it would do no good to have individual owners surrender their monopoly power only to allow a private
entity to monopolize an entire community‘s set of options for a given use.
147
The option could be unlimited in term while yet held by the government, but the option period should be
strictly limited upon its transfer to a third party. See text accompanying note 150, infra.
145
146
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Using options to extend flexibility to others necessarily means
restricting one‘s own flexibility. I have emphasized throughout that the
future is fraught with uncertainty and that new information unfolds over
time. This is true at the individual owner and parcel level, as well as at a
larger scale. How, when, and at what price should an owner who
previously optioned or alienated entitlements, or a new owner of a parcel on
which entitlements have been optioned or alienated, be able to reclaim
control over that entitlement?148 As Figure 1 suggests, there are at least
three relevant points in the timeline. First, there is the initial transfer of a
call option to the local governmental entity, which we can designate as
having occurred at Time 0. Then, at Time 1, the call option is resold to
another party. Finally, at Time 2, the option is exercised by the other party.
Between Time 0 and Time 1, it would be feasible to allow owners to
buy back their options by repaying the initial flexibility payment along with
an additional increment to cover administrative costs. But it would be
advisable to add restrictions to ensure that this buyback alternative is not
elected strategically (that is, as soon as the original owner gets wind that
someone may be interested in using the entitlement). One approach would
be to make any entitlement for which an option is reacquired inalienable for
a certain period, or alienable only by re-exercising a put option to return it
to the government‘s option exchange at the price at which it was originally
surrendered.149
Between Time 1 and Time 2, the limited option exercise period
established by the government when the option is transferred to a third
party, the original owner would be unable to call back the option except by
negotiating a deal with the option holder. Keeping the exercise period of
the option relatively short once it is in the third party‘s hands reduces the
chance that the option holder will become the lower-valuing user of the
underlying entitlement in the interim. If that were to happen, the original
owner could still attempt to buy back the option from the option holder
before it is exercised,150 but the option holder could refuse to sell in an
effort to extract more surplus from the original owner. 151 In other words,
the call option would itself be protected by a property rule, and as such
148

The possibility of multiple rounds of liability rule takings has been viewed as a conceptual difficulty with
the liability rule or call option approach, although one that can be addressed through various mechanisms. See
Rose, supra note 138, at 2189 (citing and discussing Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 43); Ian Ayres & J.M. Balkin,
Legal Entitlements as Auctions: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Beyond, 106 YALE L.J. 703 (1996)).
149
The possibility of using alienability restrictions to avoid strategic behavior is discussed in, e.g., Abraham
Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Taking Compensation Private, 59 STAN. L. REV. 871 (2007); Ian Ayres & Kristin
Madison, Threatening Inefficient Performance of Injunctions and Contracts, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 45 (1999);
Fennell, supra note 51.
150
See Ayres & Talley, supra note 43, at 1042.
151
See id. at 1043-44 (noting the possibility that option holders could misrepresent their valuations).
Conversely, if the option holder learns that the original owner now values the entitlement far below the strike
price, she might threaten not to exercise the option unless the original owner makes a supplemental payment that
effectively drops the strike price. See id.

1-Jun-11]

PROPERTY AND PRECAUTION

36

would grant its holder a veto power. There is no guarantee that these
bargaining sessions would end efficiently, but they might still feature lower
transaction costs than the status quo.152
After Time 2, the party exercising the option now owns the entitlement
in question, such as the solar easement in our example. It remains to be
seen, however, whether that entitlement will, over the long run, end up
being more complementary to the new holder‘s property package, the
original owner‘s property package, or the property package of some new
and as yet unidentified claimant. Clearly, the option exchange should
remain open and available to the optioning of ―secondhand‖ entitlements.
For example, suppose Tooaytch in the story above decides to move away,
and the new owners of their parcel have no interest in solar power and no
need for the solar easement. A simple ―flexibility payment,‖ similar to the
one originally offered to Wunnell, could encourage these new owners to
restore an option on the entitlement to the option exchange. This would help
to ensure that the easement is eventually reunited with the original parcel if
that is the efficient outcome, or transferred to yet another party if that
becomes the efficient result.
More than this might also be done, however, if we fear that the rigidity
of veto rights (this time held by the entitlement‘s new owner) will cause
entitlement patterns to become stuck in an inefficient equilibrium. If one
believes that the block that makes up a traditional property holding tends to
be made up of highly complementary elements and that long-term
complements deviating from that pattern are rare,153 then there could be
reacquisition protocols that grant special rights of first refusal to original
owners, that guarantee that later sales to them will be at a certain capped
rate, or that otherwise limit alienability in an effort to prevent holdups.154
152
For example, the option exchange platform may let the parties find out about their mutual interest in the
entitlement before any costs have been incurred in reliance, and could ease the logistics of interacting. Ayres and
Talley have also argued that bargaining may be easier in the shadow of a liability rule (here, the call option) than
in the shadow of a property rule, because information about the original owner‘s valuation will be embedded the
type of transaction she proposes (that is, whether she offers the option holder a payment not to exercise the option,
or a payment to exercise it). See id. at 1036-47. This point has been disputed, however. See Louis Kaplow &
Steven Shavell, Do Liability Rules Facilitate Bargaining? A Reply to Ayres and Talley, 105 YALE L.J. 221 (1995);
see also Ian Ayres and Eric Talley, Distinguishing Between Consensual and Nonconsensual Advantages of
Liability Rules, 105 YALE L.J. 235 (1995) (responding to Kaplow and Shavell‘s critique). In any event, a short
exercise period that limits opportunities for large valuation swings should help to reduce the risks of bargaining
failure in the option‘s post-acquisition, pre-exercise period. I thank Ed Iacobucci for prompting me to consider
these issues.
153
See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Modularity in Contracts: Boilerplate and Information Flow, 104 MICH. L.
REV. 1175, 1185, 1196 (2006) (discussing how the right to exclude may make specification of complements
unnecessary in property, and noting the possibility that complementarity ―sometimes track[s] prelegal natural
boundaries‖).
154
See supra note 149. Such an approach would ensure that the option exchange would not introduce an
―anticommons‖ tragedy. For background on the anticommons problem, see generally Michael Heller, The Tragedy
of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998). The core
strategic dilemma associated with the anticommons is the holdout problem generated by the separate ownership of
complementary fragments. See generally Lee Anne Fennell, Common Interest Tragedies, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 907
(2004); see also James M. Buchanan & Yong J. Yoon, Symmetric Tragedies: Commons and Anticommons, 43 J.L.
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Sunsets on the transferred entitlements, after which ownership would
automatically revert to the original owner, would be another possibility.155
It is possible, however, that the spatial box will become an increasingly
obsolete proxy for complementary entitlements. In that case, we might
refrain from granting special rights to the original entitlement holder but
look for ways to more broadly add flexibility enhancers, like special
auction-like protocols for further alienability.
I have focused so far on using options to accomplish transfers to parties
who intend to use the subject entitlements themselves. But unless some
limits were placed on the resale of options (and the underlying
entitlements), the monopoly power of individual property owners might be
replaced by the monopoly power of a party who aggressively buys up
control of many entitlements of a certain type.156 To forestall this result, the
option exchange might directly police who can buy options; for example, it
might require that the acquisition of the underlying entitlement plausibly
enhance the would-be buyer‘s own property.157 Another alternative would
be to limit alienability, as through holding periods or resale protocols, in an
effort to select for purchasers interested in personally using the
entitlement.158
The idea of adding alienability restrictions to constrain strategic
behavior following an entitlement‘s initial optioning raises the question of
whether directly applying such measures to all entitlements at present
would be a better way to enhance flexibility. I think the answer is a
qualified no, because we do not yet have good information about the kinds
of entitlements for which such flexibility will ultimately prove most
valuable. Selective use of put options as that information begins to emerge
can offer a lower-impact way to begin a transition from an unduly blocky
conception of ownership. But it is possible that an option exchange could
be a transitional institution, and that in the longer run entitlements
embedded with certain kinds of flexibility preservatives could, much like
shatterproof glass, become the new standard.

& ECON. 1, 5 n.5 (2000). The option exchange approach addresses this core problem by allowing entitlements that
are in fact complementary (whether or not they are contained within the same spatial blocks) to be united more
easily, through a voluntary rather than coercive process. Adding limitations going forward could ensure similarly
easy reunification with the initial owner‘s block (or with any other holding to which the interest is
complementary).
155
See Rule, supra note 21, at 892-93 (recommending that solar easements be limited in duration).
156
Cf. Banner, supra note 73, at 35 (describing the plot of Herbert Quick‘s 1909 novel, Virginia of the
Airlanes, in which ―a mysterious enterprise called the Universal Nitrates and Air Products Company is found to
have been quietly purchasing the air above farms, streets, and waterways all over the world, creating a plaid
pattern made up of long strips of air ownership‖).
157
In other words, the option exchange might contemplate only transfers of easements appurtenant, which
would typically run with land. See, e.g., DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 767-68 (7th ed. 2010).
158
See, e.g., Fennell, supra note 51, at 1440; Rose-Ackerman, supra note 51, at 953-54.
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C. Extensions
While the solar versus sequoias example is not trivial, it is meant to
illustrate a much broader set of possibilities for addressing unpriced draws
against future flexibility. Consider a few ways that the notion of
precautionary entitlement concessions could be extended.
1. WYSIWYG-ing Land Use
One way to think about the communication deficit flagged above159 is as
a failure of the ―what you see is what you get‖ (―WYSIWYG‖) 160 principle
that pervasively guides our physical interactions. As we move about in the
world, whether on foot or in a vehicle, our ability to avoid collisions
depends crucially on getting accurate real-time information about the
position of others relative to our own. A large fraction of ordinary (and
usually unremarked) precautions are dependent on direct observation, which
conveys information not only about where others are at a given point in
time, but also about which direction they are moving, and at what speed. So
important is our reliance on WYSIWYG assumptions, in fact, that
departures are usually flagged with warnings (e.g., ―objects in the mirror are
closer than they appear‖ or ―hidden driveway‖). In the land use arena,
there is considerably less transparency, making it harder for land users to
predict how best to avoid a conflict. Zoning advances predictability,161 but
it comes with some well-known costs. Optioning specific entitlements like
solar or view easements could surgically forestall known sources of
conflict, as already discussed. A more ambitious approach would involve
transforming property holdings from opaque ―black boxes‖162 to
WYSIWYG-compliant entitlement packages.
How might this be accomplished? Suppose that a local governmental
entity, instead of buying options on specific entitlements like solar
easements, instead offered landowners payments for a bundle of options
that collectively covered the inverse of all existing and planned uses—the
empty space filling the owner‘s block of property after her own current and
expected uses are spoken for. In effect, the owner would have the
opportunity to place virtual shrinkwrap around both existing and planned
159

See supra Part I.B.3.
Back in the early days of the personal computer, the acronym WYSIWYG (―what you see is what you
get‖) defined an aspirational ideal—software that could display on the screen something that resembled the look
of the printed document.
161
See, e.g., White & Wittman, supra note 92, at 266 (―Spatial zoning has the advantage over prospective
liability rules in that it shifts the burden of forecasting future land-use patterns from individual land users (and the
courts retrospectively) to a planning authority. It thus reduces uncertainty.‖).
162
See Henry E. Smith, Mind the Gap: The Indirect Relation Between Ends and Means in American
Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 959, 969 (2010); see also text accompanying notes 220-225, infra.
160
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uses (with no distinction between the two) and option the balance. Under
this inverse shrinkwrap or WYSIWYG approach, participating landowners
might use a computer-assisted drawing program to define the spatial
parameters they plan to permanently physically occupy163 and to indicate,
using specified categories,164 the sets of uses they contemplate for those
spaces.
Significantly, this approach would not involve owners selling off
everything in a given parcel‘s three-dimensional box that lies outside of the
owner‘s current actual use, or even outside of her currently planned uses. It
would not even mean selling off an easement with respect to those spaces
and uses. Rather, it would mean softening the edges of the property holding
with respect to those spaces and uses by allowing neighboring owners to
unilaterally acquire negative easements. These other owners would be able
acquire and exercise call options from the option exchange in which the
WYSIWYG options have been deposited, thereby privately placing
restrictions, at a price, on new uses and expansions that would interfere with
the neighboring owner‘s own uses.165
Here it becomes important to note the degree to which this approach
tracks and diverges from existing arrangements. Governmental bodies
already hold what amount to free options166 to add a fairly wide range of
restrictions to the spaces and uses that owners have left fallow.167 At most,
the government would be required to pay fair market value to restrict or
acquire uses or spaces.168 But the government‘s use of such regulatory
options effects an involuntary transfer of land use entitlements, which might
be opposed on grounds of both efficiency and fairness in particular
instances. The resulting land use controls are also lumpy in nature; the
switch is typically thrown for all parcels in a given zone or area, or not at
all. As such, the tool may be too blunt to achieve the right level of
precaution in contexts where small adjustments among neighbors are
sufficient. Allowing owners to voluntarily make options available as to
unused entitlement space thus offers a distinctive alternative that might
advance owner autonomy by reducing some of the pressures toward
overbroad land use regulation.
163
As already suggested, many landowners use significant proportions of their land and airspace in a passive
manner as a buffer or source of light and air, or for transient uses like kite-flying or frisbee tossing.
164
For example, the categories used for zoning classifications might be used.
165
Some limits would be necessary to avoid certain kinds of problems, like anticompetitive or spiteful option
exercises.
166
The option is free in the sense of not requiring a monetary payment. There is a political price, although it
may be negative in a given instance.
167
See, e.g., Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
168
If a governmental restriction were held to amount to a regulatory taking, just compensation in the form of
fair market value would be required by the Takings Clause. See, e.g., Coniston Corp. v. Village of Hoffman
Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 464 (7th Cir. 1988) (explaining that ―‘just compensation‘ has been held to be satisfied by
payment of market value‖).
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2. Pay Me To Stand It
Thus far, my examples have focused on cases where the precaution that
keeps a given conflict from arising involves owners curtailing their own
affirmative uses (that is, refraining from growing tall trees or building viewblocking additions). The WYSIWYG approach in the previous section is
merely a generalization of that idea, again focusing on how ceding rights to
certain externality-producing uses can reduce conflict. But curtailing uses
that can cause offense is only one side of the interaction; there is also the
question of one‘s willingness to withstand the potentially offensive use.
Certainly, we might expect the most sensitive individuals to locate in places
where they can acquire more rights to control what their neighbors do.
Thus, the households that are most bent on solar energy would locate in
places where they can acquire their neighbors‘ solar easements, the
households that are most sensitive to changes in views would locate in
places where they can acquire view easements, and laundries would locate
next to businesses that are willing to alienate any right to emit. Over time,
this would tend to place those who are relatively less sensitive next to
landowners who have not chosen to option control over their prospective
uses. But sorting could take place on a more fine-grained basis if we could
work from the ―most insensitive‖ side of the spectrum as well, easing
transactions between those who cause impacts and those best positioned to
endure them.169
How might this work? Limited instances already exist where those
causing spillovers have offered payments to neighboring landowners in
exchange for their acceptance of impacts.170 While it is easiest to imagine
owners being willing to sell exposure to discrete impacts like wind turbine
noise, tolerated impacts might also be framed in broader terms, such as
certain decibel limits.171 Or some owners might offer options that would
expose them to certain classes of impacts (barking dogs, say) only on
condition that the same impacts be tolerated by the purchaser.172
To be sure, these sorts of options raise a bevy of concerns that are not
169

Of course, sorting can also occur in response to actual or planned uses, with land prices playing a
mediating role. See Vicki Been, What‟s Fairness Got to Do With It? Environmental Justice and the Siting of
Locally Undesirable Land Uses, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1001, 1016-18 (1993). The difference here is that option
sales could send signals that precede, and hence influence, actual land use choices, while also providing
compensation to those who make themselves vulnerable to impacts. Auction processes for making siting
decisions offer a similar approach, albeit one that is typically envisioned as engaging collectives rather than
individual households. For discussion and critique of such siting proposals, see, for example, Been, supra, at
1052-55.
170
See, e.g., William Yardley, Turbines Too Loud? Here, Take $5,000, N.Y. Times, July 31, 2010 (reporting
on energy company‘s payments of $5,000 to residents who signed a waiver agreeing not to complain about the
noise of wind turbines).
171
This would amount to the flip side of performance zoning, a kind of performance ―unzoning.‖
172
This is a rough analogue of the ―share alike‖ feature in Creative Commons.
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implicated, or at least not implicated as strongly, by agreements to yield
incompatible active uses of one‘s own (like building sun-blocking
structures) to facilitate passive uses (like solar collection). Here, the
situation is reversed: one agrees to yield one‘s own passive uses (such as
enjoying peace and quiet) to the incompatible, active uses of others. For
one thing, being the first to announce a willingness to accept certain kinds
of impacts could draw a disproportionate number of such impacts to one‘s
doorstep.173 This makes it less clear precisely what one is giving up. A
similar result follows if information asymmetries exist or people are just not
very good at predicting how certain kinds of impacts will affect their own
preferred uses. The fact that people with more limited resources would be
more likely to trade off quality of life for cash raises the same sorts of
fairness concerns that we have seen in many other contexts, including those
involving siting decisions.174 Finally, the underlying interest being optioned
in this context does not correspond to a garden variety easement, but rather
to an agreement not to complain about impacts. While similar servitudelike permanent damages have been awarded by courts,175 a market
transaction that renders one‘s property permanently vulnerable to future
impacts may differ in relevant respects from a remedial choice that is
implemented after the impact is in evidence.176

3. Putting Up With Abandonment
Another potential source of inefficiency in land transactions involves
property that no longer produces positive value for its owner. Interestingly,
the common law does not allow owners to abandon fee interests in land.177
Assuming that another owner could put the property to better use, this
nonwaivable indefinite continuation of ownership presents obvious
inefficiencies. Often this suboptimal ownership is ultimately resolved
through forfeiture (whether due to unpaid property taxes or an unpaid
mortgage), but those processes have their own shortcomings. Not only may
they be protracted, the parties to whom the fee interest would be forfeited
may have little interest in claiming it.178
173
Cf. Lee Anne Fennell, Contracting Communities, 2004 U. Ill. L. Rev. 829, 866 (noting how an adverse
selection dynamic might impede certain moves toward less restrictive private community rules).
174
See, e.g., Been, supra note 169, at 1016-18 (discussing the possibility that siting decisions induce moves
that result in the clustering of lower-income populations near the locally undesirable land use).
175
See Boomer v. Atlantic Cement, 257 N.E.2d 870, 875 (1970).
176
The concern might go back to information asymmetries or uncertainty over the ultimate extent of the
impacts. I thank Eduardo Peñalver for discussions on this point and on the related issues raised in this paragraph.
177
See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Abandon, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 355, 359–60, 399–402 (2010).
178
See, e.g., Susan Saulny, Banks Starting to Walk Away on Foreclosures, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2009,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/30/us/30walkaway.html. One solution is to legally require the
lienholder to take title. See Strahilevitz, supra note 177, at 388.
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There are other escape hatches as well—notably adverse possession and
eminent domain. Yet each of these involuntary transfer mechanisms comes
with significant costs that can be traced to uncertainty about whether the
existing owner is really a low-valuer. This uncertainty creates a risk of
undercompensation and, in the case of would-be adverse possessors, a risk
of lost investment efforts.179 Yet the law provides low-valuing owners with
no incentive to identify themselves and turn over their property voluntarily;
indeed, it denies them even the simple expedient of formally renouncing
their ownership and returning their property to the common pool. Even (or
perhaps especially) if we think that abandonment generates externalities that
make policymakers reluctant to encourage it,180 a deposit-refund system
could be usefully employed that involves paying for potential disposal costs
upfront.181 Granting owners who later voluntarily relinquish ownership to a
common bank a refund of part or all of an initial charge for disposal costs
would remove the delay and guesswork that now accompanies transfers
from very low-valuing owners to higher-valuing ones.
4. The Problem of Assembly: Lessons from Groupon
Consistent with the road accident analogy, the analysis thus far has
taken place at an extreme micro level, examining conflicts between two
neighbors. This simplification has been helpful in illustrating how
entitlements might be voluntarily adjusted to avoid conflicts, but it has done
little to suggest how land use rigidities might be loosened on a broader
scale. To be sure, some unfreezing or unsticking would be expected if more
fine-grained land use transactions make unnecessary broader-based, inertiaproducing land use controls like zoning and community-wide covenant
schemes. But because many efficient land use transitions depend on groups
of nearby landowners agreeing on something (or having their objections
overridden), the concept of precautionary land use entitlements will be most
useful if it can harness coordination on a broader scale.
A number of scholars have devised elaborate mechanisms for
aggregating landowner consent through modifications to (or substitutes for)
the eminent domain process.182 My goal here is neither to recount those
179

See Strahilevitz, supra note 177at 416-17.
See id. at 400-01.
181
See Tideman, supra note 26, at 347 (suggesting that ―any person who transformed a site in a way that
made it expensive to restore that site to a condition of "bare land" could be required to post an interest-bearing
bond that would run with the land, against the contingency that his site would be abandoned and require
restoration‖). Lior Strahilevitz makes a related suggestion: requiring abandoning owners to clearly mark off the
property and publicize their intentions, with the possibility of favorable tax treatment (or avoiding a fine or
penalty). Strahilevitz, supra note 177, at 408-09. Collecting the disposal fee in advance makes it easier to offer
an attractive carrot for complying with such rules of proper disposition, and avoids the problem of trying to
extract penalties from someone who is missing or insolvent.
182
E.g., Michael A. Heller & Rick Hills, Land Assembly Districts, 151 HARV. L. REV. 1465 (2008); Amnon
180
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contributions nor to formulate a new, full-blown replacement for eminent
domain. Instead, I want to briefly suggest how the option exchange ideas
developed here could be extended to aggregation problems, whether
involving entire fee interests or smaller entitlements, through the use of
mechanisms for collecting conditional or contingent consent.183 Contingent
consent, as I use the term,184 simply means agreement that is binding only if
enough relevantly situated others also agree. A current example is found in
Groupon‘s business model.185 On a daily basis, discount offers from local
providers of goods and services, such as restaurants, theaters, and spas, are
widely disseminated to subscribers, who can opt to accept the deal during a
limited time (a day or so) or let it pass by. In each case, the provider will
have specified a minimum number of acceptances necessary to make the
deal ―tip.‖ If not enough takers are found, the deal is off and none of the
takers receives, or is bound by, the deal.186
Although Groupon is fairly new, the idea it embodies is not. It has long
been recognized that a system that makes one party‘s contribution to a
particular good contingent on the contributions of enough others can play a
crucial role in collective funding settings.187 The technique is especially
useful where ―step goods‖ are involved—goods like bridges that are of little
value until a certain increment (enough to span the chasm) is provided.188
Land use entitlements are often similarly ―lumpy‖ in that they are much
more valuable when aggregated. Unlike the funding mechanism for a
bridge, however, the aggregation necessary in the land use context tends to
be spatially sensitive. Thus, if one wishes to run a very noisy machine that
will bother one‘s ten closest neighbors, it is not enough to aggregate ―noisy
machine consent‖ from ten random households in one‘s town; rather, you

Lehavi & Amir N. Licht, Eminent Domain, Inc., 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1704 (2007); Bell & Parchomovsky, supra
note 149; Scott Duke Kominers & E. Glen Weyl, Concordance Among Holdouts (April 2010), available at
http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~weyl/Holdout_4_10.pdf.
183
The approach I discuss here is distinct from one in which entire communities would be given the
opportunity to exercise a given option. See, e.g., Rule, supra note 105, at 49-54 (describing a ―Green Community
Tax Credit‖ that might be offered by the state to communities that accommodate renewable energy uses).
184
Margaret Levi uses the term ―contingent consent‖ in a slightly different but analogous way. MARGARET
LEVI, CONSENT, DISSENT, AND PATRIOTISM 19 (1997) (defining ―contingent consent‖ as ―a citizen‘s decision to
comply or volunteer in response to demands from a government only if she perceives government as trustworthy
and she is satisfied other citizens are also engaging in ethical reciprocity‖).
185
See Groupon, Learn How Groupon Works, http://www.groupon.com/learn.
186
See id.; see also Felix Salmon, Grouponomics, May 4, 2011 14:23, available at
http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2011/05/04/grouponomics (analyzing Groupon‘s business model).
187
See, e.g., JON ELSTER, THE CEMENT OF SOCIETY: A STUDY OF SOCIAL ORDER 42 (1989); Mark Bagnoli
& Michael McKee, Voluntary Contribution Games: Efficient Private Provision of Public Goods, 29 ECON.
INQUIRY 351 (1991). Indeed, Groupon‘s predecessor was The Point, which harnesses collective action in just
such a manner. See G-Team: Groupon + The Point, http://www.groupon.com/g-team; The Point: Make
Something Happen, http://www.thepoint.com/.
188
See, e.g., Michael Taylor & Hugh Ward, Chickens, Whales, and Lumpy Goods: Alternative Models of
Public-Goods Provision, 30 POLIT. STUD. 350 (1982); Russell Hardin, Group Provision of Step Goods, 21
BEHAV. SCI. 101 (1976); Jean Hampton, Free-Rider Problems in the Production of Collective Goods, 3 ECON. &
PHIL. 245 (1987).
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need those ten nearest neighbors to consent.189 And it is well-known that
holdout problems can preclude assembly of such consent.190
What drives the holdout dynamic in multi-player aggregation settings
boils down to the leverage that can be obtained by holding the last piece of
a very valuable assembly.191 Thus, one promising avenue is to make that
leverage unavailable through mechanisms like ―most favored nations‖
clauses that promise everyone who consents to a given assembly an equally
valuable share of the assembly surplus, regardless of whether they agree to
the deal early or late in the game.192 Heterogeneity in valuation and other
difficulties often make this approach (and others that similarly rely on preestablished divisions of surplus) hard to operationalize.193 Hybrid
approaches in which contingent consent triggers coercion once a certain
numeric threshold is reached offer an alternative. Compulsory unitization
of oil and gas interests is a prominent real-world example of this
approach.194
A proposal by Peter Colwell works through another incarnation of this
idea—a type of ―tender offer‖ that might be made by a developer who
wished to intensify use beyond the bounds permitted by existing law. 195 In
Groupon-like fashion, the developer sends letters to the neighbors offering
them money for their consent, but explaining that the deal will only ―tip‖
when a certain percentage (say, 80%) agree; otherwise the deal is off.196
The story doesn‘t end when the deal tips, however. With as few as 80% of
the neighbors in agreement, something more is necessary, and that
something more turns out to involve overriding the consent of those who
did not accept the offer. In an interesting twist on the ―most favored nation‖
approach, those who did not voluntarily accept the offer receive a somewhat
lower amount than those who did, again to counter the usual holdout
dynamic.197 It is unsurprising that Colwell‘s proposal, like most other
189
This assumes that each of the neighbors would have the right to block the noise in a nuisance action,
which might or might not be the case.
190
See, e.g., James M. Buchanan, The Institutional Structure of Externality, 14 PUBLIC CHOICE 69, 73-74
(1973).
191
See, e.g., Becker-Posner Blog, The Kelo Case, Public Use, and Eminent Domain--Posner Comment, June
26, 2005, 9:09 p.m., http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/2005/06/the-kelo-case-public-use-and-eminent-domain-posner-comment.html (describing right-of-way settings in which each owner ―hopes to be the last holdout after
the company has purchased an easement from every other landowner--easements that will be worthless if it
doesn't obtain an easement from that last holdout‖).
192
See Douglas Gary Lichtman, Patent Holdouts in the Standard-Setting Process, Academic Advisory
Council Bulletin (Progress & Freedom Found., Washington, D.C.), May 2006, at 4, http://www.pff.org/issuespubs/ip/bulletins/bulletin1.3patent.pdf (describing this approach in the patent context).
193
See, e.g., Gary D. Libecap, Contracting for Property Rights, in PROPERTY RIGHTS: COOPERATION,
CONFLICT, AND LAW 142, 156-65 (Terry L. Anderson & Fred S. McChesney, eds., 2003) (discussing problems
negotiating prospective division of proceeds and costs in the unitization context).
194
See id. at 161-62 (discussing compulsory unitization).
195
Peter F. Colwell, Tender Mercies: Efficient and Equitable Land Use Change, 25 REAL ESTATE ECON.
525 (1997).
196
Id. at 532-33.
197
Id. at 531

1-Jun-11]

PROPERTY AND PRECAUTION

45

serious attempts to address aggregation problems in land use, contains an
element of coercion (via supermajority rule) to get the job done.198 A
requirement of unanimous agreement sets a very high bar, and one that is
likely to keep property entitlements stuck indefinitely in low-valued uses.199
Put another way, we should not be surprised that coercion cannot be
avoided altogether in reconfiguring property rights, if we understand
ownership itself as involving a kind of coercion that operates against the
rest of the world.
Nonetheless, a precautionary take on property rights might lead us to
ask what kinds of voluntary entitlement reconfigurations would costeffectively reduce the need for coercive realignments. Instead of attempting
to construct a system that would fully substitute for familiar coercive
mechanisms like zoning, eminent domain, and the use of damages remedies
(liability rules) to override neighbor objections, we might consider instead
how small innovations could make resort to those devices less necessary.
An option exchange that offers a platform for non-coercive Groupon-like
offerings in land use rights is an unexplored alternative. In cases where
multiple configurations would suffice, a system for collecting options can
offer a relatively low-cost way of determining how best to proceed.200
Voluntary platforms for assembling relinquished veto rights could prove
especially useful for projects that do not exhibit strict spatial
complementarity (that is, where something under 100% participation would
provide substantial benefits).
5. Quitclaiming
The discussion to this point has assumed, counterfactually, that the
property rights in question are clear-cut as a legal matter and transparent to
the parties. Often, this will not be the case.201 Here the possibility that
198
Id.; see also Libecap, supra note 193, at 161-62 (compulsory unitization); Heller & Hills, supra note, at
182, at 1520-25 (discussing overrides of dissenters in land assembly districts and a number of related institutional
structures); Robert H. Nelson, Privatizing the Neighborhood: A Proposal to Replace Zoning with Private
Collective Property Rights to Existing Neighborhoods, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 827, 834 (1999) (supermajority
rule for superimposing newly created neighborhood associations onto existing communities and binding all
residents to the association‘s charter).
199
JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 63-72 & figs. 1-3 (1962) (discussing and illustrating the tradeoffs associated with
moving away from a unanimity rule); see also Gerald Korngold, Resolving the Intergenerational Conflicts of Real
Property Law: Preserving Free Markets and Personal Autonomy for Future Generations, 56 AM. U. L. REV.
1525, 1580 (2007) (―Eminent domain in the redevelopment context has been the public‘s key trump card to meet
community needs, address market imperfections and holdouts, and advance the civic condition.‖).
200
See text accompanying infra note 211 (discussing similar uses of options for pipelines). Options allow
would-be assemblers to test the viability of various assemblies at relatively low cost, rather than being daunted by
the prospect of encountering a holdout. Even if would-be holdouts exist in each potential assembly area, the
bargaining power of each will be diminished by the competition provided by those in other potential assembly
areas. I thank Ted Seto and Ed Iacobucci for discussions on these points.
201
See generally Sterk, supra note 11.
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parties might give up something that they may or may not actually own
becomes interesting. The law already contains a mechanism that lets people
do precisely this when conveying real property: the quitclaim deed. Such a
deed amounts to a release of one‘s own claim, if any, on the property.
Quitclaims can also convey interests less expansive than full fee estates.202
For obvious reasons, a conveyance by quitclaim can be risky for the buyer;
there may be another claimant in the woodwork.203 Quitclaims are most
useful where the person granting it is the only plausible claimant, aside
from the recipient. In many cases involving potentially conflicting land
uses, this criterion could be met. Hence, in the tree-solar example, the fact
that the law might be unclear about whose interests will dominate in the
event of a conflict would not preclude a precautionary quitclaim of a solar
easement from the would-be tree grower to the would-be solar power user,
or vice versa.
Of course, where incompatible uses are known, the government can
simultaneously clarify rights and offer to buy options to transfer them.
Where conflicting uses are yet unknown, the government can nonetheless
facilitate broad and bundled relinquishments of the sort associated with the
WYSIWYG alternative.204 Some of what an owner cedes monopoly control
over may not really turn out to be within her package of entitlements (or, as
already suggested, might be removed from her bundle by regulatory action
at a later date). Nonetheless, there are benefits of certainty and conflict
avoidance that would be associated with a clear assignment of that element
to another party. And if the underlying transaction holds value, so too
would an option interface to facilitate it. To be sure, a land user who
believes she does not need to purchase a given right can choose a different
path—agitating for regulation or initiating (or provoking) a lawsuit, but
those alternatives have costs of their own.
Returning again to the accident analogy, it is clear that we constantly do
the equivalent of quitclaiming in everyday life to avoid conflict. We wave
other motorists ahead of us, we step aside or stand still to let other
pedestrians know that we are yielding to them, we pull our dogs to one side
to avoid oncoming canines, and so on. In most of these cases, it is uncertain
who has the right of way, and thus unclear whether we are complying with a
duty we owe or giving up a right that we possess, yet the system works
202
See, e.g., City of Manhattan Beach v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 4th 232, 256-57 (1996) (Mosk, J.,
concurring and dissenting) (―[A]ny interest in land that can be conveyed by deed is conveyable by quitclaim
deed. This includes an easement. . . . It even includes a reversionary interest such as a right to recover possession
on breach of condition subsequent.) (citations omitted).
203
Unsurprisingly, empirical work reflects a substantial discount for transfers subject to quitclaim deeds.
See David Brasington & Robert F. Sarama, Deed Types, Mortgage Rates, and House Prices, 36 REAL ESTATE
ECON. 587, 588 (2008) (finding, based on a data set of over 37,000 home sales, that ―[h]ouses selling with general
warranty deeds sell for almost 100% more than those selling with quit claim deeds‖).
204
See supra Part II.C.1.
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tolerably well.205 Property is not currently set up in a way that makes
similar informal adjustments easy to achieve, except where strong norms of
neighborliness apply. And even a sustained attitude of neighborliness
cannot answer the antecedent question of whether two owners engaging in
potential conflicting uses should be neighbors in the first place. Setting up
a system whereby owners can indicate their willingness to avoid
confrontation over rights that they may or may not hold can add value in
guiding those decisions.
To be sure, there are a welter of issues that surround any approach to
legal uncertainty, including this one. For one thing, any popularized
protocol for dealing with uncertainty may alter the law itself.206 If people
start routinely paying for solar easements, for example, the law might
become less likely to grant solar users an entitlement to enjoy solar access
gratis by, for example, prohibiting tall trees next door. But it is not obvious
why this way of resolving legal uncertainty presents a particular problem.207
It is also possible that a ―paying for solar‖ norm would never emerge, given
other ways that a system of options might interact with legal doctrine. For
instance, the concessionary signal given by the putative owner might seem
to invite neighbors to enjoy the benefits of an unused and obviously lowvalued entitlement without paying for a transfer, especially when the law is
uncertain about whether buying the easement is really necessary.208
205
Cf. ELLICKSON, supra note 58, at 52-56 (examining how, in rural Shasta County, norms coupled with an
ethic of ―live and let live‖ make legal rules largely irrelevant to day-to-day dealings). Perhaps more directly
analogous to the situation of a landowner purchasing an easement that might be granted for free in court, consider
the many instances in which people make payments that may or may not be required, simply in order to avoid
conflict: adding an extra stamp to a letter that is ambiguously close to a given weight limit, adding quarters to a
parking meter on a holiday that parking officials may or may not recognize, taking a less aggressive stance on a
tax matter, and so on.
206
See, e.g., James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116 YALE L.J.
882, 890-900 (2007) (describing a ―feedback loop‖ in which copyright licensing prompted by risk aversion yields
licensing practices that produce doctrinal constrictions of fair use); Jennifer Rothman The Questionable Use of
Custom in Intellectual Property, 93 VA. L. REV. 1899, 1946-67 (2007) (critiquing the use of custom in intellectual
property law on a variety of grounds, including the potential for entrenchment).
207
The objection to doctrinal drift in the intellectual property context stems from a normative view on how
limited or expansive the underlying rights should be. See, e.g., Gibson, supra note 206, at 993 (arguing that the
existing feedback loops will stifle creativity and compromise culture). Such drift would be equally undesirable in
the land use context if we were certain that it would cause an augmentation of the entitlements of a party who is a
lower-valuing user. Hence, a good reason for opposing a system of options for airplane overflight rights would be
a concern that a pattern of micropayments for flight paths would ensue that would entrench owners‘ ad coelum
rights and make every nonpaying airline liable—a bad outcome if we are pretty certain that the airline is always
the higher valuing user. But where we are uncertain which of two rival uses will prove more valuable in a given
time and place, options offer an alternative to litigation and lobbying. Takings law also interacts with entitlement
transfer mechanisms in interesting, and to some extent countervailing, ways. For example, government would be
less able to override solar access rights wholesale (as by enacting a ―right to trees‖ law) if it had to pay just
compensation to large numbers of people who have actually purchased solar easements thanks to an options
system. In this case, an entrenchment in the direction of solar access (through buying easements) would
counterbalance the entrenchment in the direction of preexisting rights to grow trees that the solar access sales
might be thought to produce. Compare this with the copyright case, where widespread purchase of unnecessary
rights is thought to entrench the rights of copyright holders without producing any countervailing enhancement of
the legal position of those purchasing the unneeded rights. See id.
208
This issue exists to some degree whether the law is clear or not, but it is intensified where the law is
uncertain and known to be so, for the reasons suggested in the text.
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Thus, we might actually see the opposite norm—that of not paying for
solar—emerge. An owner‘s willingness to cede monopoly rights over a
solar easement against a background of legal uncertainty might reassure a
neighboring solar power user that solar access is unlikely to be blocked. It
might seem implausible that an owner who signals that she doesn‘t much
care about using her vertical space will risk losing a lawsuit and having to
tear down improvements or destroy trees. Yet again, it is not clear why this
is a particular problem. If a land use conflict is successfully avoided, the
precautionary goals behind the option system have been fulfilled, whether
through the signaling just suggested or through a transferred quitclaim that
clarifies rights in favor of the solar user.
Going forward, a nonpaying solar user understands that legal
uncertainty may be resolved against her, and thus understands that she
invests in solar power at her own risk. She knows that her option-ceding
neighbor may change his mind about trees, reclaim the option, and start a
forest next door, or may sell to someone who will do so. Moreover, she
recognizes that the possibility the law will be resolved against her grows as
more and more solar users choose to purchase options and as solar
easements become a more and more commonplace object of commerce.
Thus the ―rights accretion‖ and the ―concessionary signal‖ theories may to
some degree counterbalance each other, and even if they do not do so
perfectly, there is no reason to suppose that their combined effects will be
more deleterious for the overall path of the law than the status quo blend of
litigation and lobbying.

III. OBJECTIONS AND CONNECTIONS
The ideas sketched above have opened up more avenues of inquiry than
I can begin to pursue in this paper. This final Part is devoted to offering
some brief thoughts on two sets of issues that bear on the feasibility and
normative desirability of precautionary entitlement design. I begin by
addressing some standard challenges, and then turn to discuss connections
between the approach I suggest here and a variety of theoretical debates.
A. The Standard Questions
The suggestion that governmental entities become involved in
delivering new forms of entitlement customization must first address some
predictable objections, starting with the standard query: if this were such a
good idea, wouldn‘t it already exist? Closely related is the question of
whether government provision is really necessary or whether private
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markets could suffice. Another question is whether the approach taken here
really adds anything new, or whether we already have mechanisms that do
everything that I am suggesting is necessary.
In fact, property entitlement customization does exist. Easements and
covenants are firmly established entries in the property lexicon.209 But for
reasons already discussed, the most familiar incarnations of private
covenants—networks of reciprocal restrictions that govern common interest
communities—do not deliver the flexibility benefits that an option exchange
could. The same goes for zoning and other types of top-down regulation.
While it is certainly true that individuals can transact in a more piecemeal
manner over entitlements, these transactions tend to become costly at
exactly the same moment that they become most valuable. Private
bargaining does sometimes occur, of course. To take a recent example, an
energy company paid $5,000 to each household near its wind turbine
operations that would agree not to complain about the noise.210 Indeed,
private systems of options are sometimes used to sidestep later bargaining
difficulties. Pipeline companies in some places use options acquisition
along multiple viable routes to work around holdout problems.211 These
cases, which involve the concentrated interest of a large entity that finds it
cost-effective to assemble entitlements, largely prove the point, however: it
is not realistic to suppose that individuals can initiate similar deals on a
broad enough scale to be useful without some institutional assistance.
Why don‘t we have institutions that can facilitate such trades, then?
Setting up an exchange to trade in future flexibility, before that flexibility is
needed, represents a type of public good. Like a number of other
undeveloped, innovative markets, the absence of a private option exchange
might be attributed to the inability of innovators to capture enough of the
gains associated with their innovations.212 The fact that entitlement trading
must occur in the shadow of potential governmental action and over long
time horizons could make expected returns to private innovators
unsustainably low, especially given the significant up-front investment
required to offer the initial put options described above. Innovators may
justifiably fear that property owners would be unwilling to try out a new
system that will implicate their property rights over time without the
209
See, e.g., Merrill & Smith, supra note 215, at 35-38; Nestor M. Davidson, Standardization and Pluralism
in Property Law, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1597, 1607 (2008).
210
See, e.g., William Yardley, Turbines Too Loud? Here, Take $5,000, N.Y. Times, July 31, 2010.
211
See
comment
on
Volokh
Conspiracy,
7/5/05
at
11:42
a.m.,
http://volkh.com/posts/1120508864.shtml#6471; National Energy Board, Pipeline Regulation in Canada: A Guide
for
Landowners
and
the
Public
13
(2003)
http://www.neb.gc.ca/clfnsi/rsftyndthnvrnmnt/sfty/rfrncmtrl/pplnrgltnncnd-eng.pdf (explaining how and why companies might use option
agreements rather than initially purchasing easements).
212
See, e.g., ROBERT J. SHILLER, MACRO MARKETS: CREATING INSTITUTIONS FOR MANAGING SOCIETY‘S
LARGEST ECONOMIC RISKS 207-08 (1993); Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, Intellectual Property for
Market Experimentation, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 337 (2008).
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imprimatur of a governmental entity.
A related possibility is that other land use accident reduction
mechanisms, notably zoning, have crowded out innovations in the domain
of entitlement design. Perhaps developed initially as a substitute for
missing insurance markets,213 land use controls have now become
entrenched institutional features, and ones that certain stakeholders and
repeat players have a vested interest in maintaining. The costs of these
familiar land use control mechanisms are significantly externalized as well,
making them appear artificially affordable. Some of the external costs fall
on other communities, as commentators have explored at great length. But
some of the costs also fall on people living in future periods, who will face
a constrained set of spatial choices.
These points, on their own, do not necessarily argue for public
provision—subsidies might be used instead, coupled with a scaling back of
public land use control. But they do suggest why we might not see a private
actor emerge to handle trades in future land use flexibility. Other
considerations, however, point toward the desirability of a public option
exchange. One such consideration relates to the role of a central (even if
geographically localized) system for delivering coordination and
communication benefits,214 as well as for establishing and implementing a
consistent methodology for pricing. This point relates to the interaction
between an option exchange and the numerus clausus, one of the points of
theoretical intersection taken up in the next subpart.
B. Property Theory Intersections
The concept of precautionary entitlement design relates in interesting
ways to, and is challenged by, several influential strains of property theory.
1. The Numerus Clausus Doctrine, In Rem Rights, and Exclusion
Perhaps the most direct challenge to the idea of a self-customizing
approach to entitlements is found in a cluster of ideas associated with the
work of Henry Smith and Thomas Merrill. Because their approach has
increasingly set the terms of property theory discourse, it is worth
recounting in some detail. According to Merrill and Smith, property
entitlements are sensibly constrained to a limited number of standardized
213
See Albert Breton, Neighborhood Selection and Zoning in ISSUES IN URBAN PUBLIC ECONOMICS 241, 249
(Harold Hochman ed., 1973) (describing ―zoning and restrictive covenants‖ as ―imperfect substitutes‖ to
insurance); see also WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS 10 (2001) (discussing this point and
citing Breton, supra).
214
See, e.g., Benito Arruñada, Property Enforcement as Organized Consent, 19 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 401,
425-28 (examining the role of a ―territorial monopoly‖ in property recordation or registration given that in rem
rights are involved).
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forms, consistent with the principle of numerus clausus, to economize on
information costs.215 Unlike endlessly customizable contractual
arrangements, property rights are in rem, ―good against the world,‖ and
hence must speak in a simple and comprehensible language.216 Although
variations from these standard-issue property blocks are possible—
property‘s lexicon includes easements, covenants, and so on—the basic
forms are meant to simplify communication between owners and
nonowners.217
For Merrill and Smith, property primarily communicates the simple
message to ―keep out.‖218 Their focus on exclusion thus fits neatly together
with both in rem rights and the numerus clausus doctrine. This is a
fundamentally outward-facing vision of property.219 Blocky, standard-issue
rights play an important role in the story, as further suggested by Smith‘s
work on modularity. For Smith, property is ―modular‖ in that it delegates
packages of control to the owner in opaque chunks.220 That each ―module‖
conceals information—the owner‘s choice among a broad range of projects
and endeavors—is a strength rather than a weakness on this account. 221 The
world at large need not concern itself (much) with what happens on the
property, in Smith‘s view, because property‘s outer shell is outfitted with a
clear ―keep off‖ sign that tells the rest of the world all it needs to know.222
Putting together Merrill and Smith‘s emphasis on optimal
standardization with Smith‘s focus on modularity leads to a view of
property that might be summed up as follows: Lego on the outside, PlayDoh on the inside.223 What happens inside the entitlement boundaries is up
215

See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The
Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 33-34 (2000) (suggesting that information cost savings can be
realized by standardizing nonobservable elements of ownership); Merrill & Smith, supra note 4, at 358 (arguing
that, due to the ―informational burden‖ associated with in rem rights, ―property is required to come in
standardized packages that the layperson can understand at low cost‖).
216
See, e.g., Merrill & Smith, supra note 215, at 35-38 (analogizing property rights to language and noting
some limits to the analogy).
217
See id.
218
See, e.g., Merrill & Smith, supra note 4, at 394-95.
219
See Katz, supra note 39, at 277 (―The focus of analysis for a boundary approach is on the position of
non-owners, which it defines in terms of a general duty not to cross over the boundaries of objects one does not
own.‖).
220
See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Community and Custom in Property, 10 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 5, 16-18 (2009);
see also Smith, supra note 53, at 1728, 1754-55 (discussing property as delegation).
221
See, e.g., Smith, supra note 162, at 969 (suggesting that owners are generally better than outsiders at
evaluating uses of property, so that ―it makes sense to make ownership a black box for some purposes‖); Smith,
supra note 220, at 17 (observing that information may be hidden within a module); Smith, supra note 153, at 1185
(―Exclusion rights implement the ‗information hiding‘ or encapsulation that is the hallmark of modularity.‖).
222
See, e.g., Smith, supra note 220, at 17; see also Smith, supra note 53, at 1728 (―On the dutyholder side,
the message is a simple one - to ‗keep out.‘‖). Smith recognizes that beyond this exclusionary core lies a
periphery where more nuanced and use-specific governance rules apply. Far from dismissing the interests at the
periphery as unimportant, he takes it as a sign of their importance that they have been able to escape the ―heavy
gravitational pull of the exclusionary regime generally used to solve the basic need for stability and coordination.‖
Smith, supra note 221, at 965.
223
See, e.g., Merrill & Smith, supra note 215 (discussing benefits of standardization); Smith, supra note
220, at 17 (noting the importance of the interface among modules and the relative unimportance to outsiders of
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to the owner (within limits). In contrast, the shape of the outer interface is
very much a matter of public interest, since it implicates the interactions
between and among owners and nonowners, as well as buyers and sellers
far into the future. Merrill and Smith‘s approach is not as stark as this brief
summary might suggest—they fully recognize that governance mechanisms
are required to control spillovers,224 and further acknowledge that
informational advances like registries can alter the efficient balance
between standardization and customization.225 Nonetheless, the potential
tension between an exclusion-focused, standardized vision of property and
technologies for facilitating owner-initiated entitlement customization
should by now be evident.
At one level, nothing in a platform for trading in entitlement options is
inconsistent with numerus clausus, since the ultimate objects of exchange
are familiar entries in the property stable: easements and covenants.226 But
as I have argued in another context, mechanisms that dramatically lower the
cost to the parties of altering property bundles are not the same creatures as
old-fashioned pairwise bargains, even if the interests that are transacted
over carry the same names.227 If the internalized cost of customization falls,
we would expect to see more of it. We thus must give serious attention to
the possibility that the resulting reduction in standardization levels would
generate externalities for third parties in the form of higher information
costs.228 Participants in a property system—those who buy, sell, hold, or fail
to hold certain interests—bear much of the cost of administering the system,
and these administrative costs are a crucial component in any cost
minimization equation.229
Yet as Glen Robinson has observed, it is far from clear how a
standardized, limited menu does much, if anything, to reduce the costs of
complying with or transacting over property rights. 230 People need not
know any details about how property is held to know that they hold no
interest in it (beyond that which background principles may grant them, as
through the public trust doctrine, or the doctrine of necessity). Whether the
what happens inside); Smith, supra note 221, at 968-69 (same); Smith, supra note 153, at 1197 (using the Lego
analogy to explain how modularity facilitates combining different basic property interests). An analogous
distinction between the internal structuring of relationships and the external legal forms used by third parties is
explored in Mary Anne Case, Marriage Licenses, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1758, 1781-83 (2005).
224
Merrill & Smith, supra note 4, at 394-95.
225
Merrill & Smith, supra note 215, at 38-42.
226
It should also be noted that nothing in the approach outlined here would preclude parties from continuing
to transact over land use entitlements in the traditional way, completely outside of the option exchange. Indeed, it
is possible that the prices developed in the option exchange would provide a reference point for private
negotiations that would help to facilitate transactions. This seems especially plausible if bargaining difficulties are
often less a function of greed than of uncertainty over valuations and the fear of being ―suckered‖ in a negotiation.
I thank Ted Seto for this point.
227
Fennell, supra note 173, at 893-94.
228
See Merrill & Smith, supra note 215, at 26-34.
229
CALABRESI, supra note 5, at 28.
230
Glen O. Robinson, Personal Property Servitudes, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1449, 1484-88 (2004).
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farm next door is held in an unusual variant on the fee tail231 or in an
ordinary fee simple absolute, nonowners know to keep off.232 Conversely,
those buying property are likely to be concerned about, and apt to incur
costs gathering information about, plenty of things that are not encapsulated
within the standardized forms—the condition of the property, the exact
shape and terrain of the land,233 the applicable zoning restrictions, and the
ways in which elements like covenants and easements interact with a given
fee estate.234 A government-run option exchange, which would include a
centralized database of completed and contingent claims on the property,
would not add materially to the burden of investigating a property‘s
attributes. Moreover, it would repay the effort with a great deal more
clarity about the nature of neighbors‘ uses and plans, enriching at relatively
low cost the information environment in which purchase decisions are
made. An option exchange, then, seems to be just the sort of innovation that
would justify a relaxation of the numerus clausus doctrine, even on Merrill
and Smith‘s own account.235
Another facet of Merrill and Smith‘s vision of property might be put in
terms of complementary entitlement packages. Their rejection of the
―bundle of rights‖ metaphor and its implicit suggestion that property
entitlements can be endlessly combined and recombined in any old way is
premised on the idea that property has a stable core of meaning. This core
is built on certain default sets of exclusion-based rights that fit together in
ways that reduce information costs (here by relying primarily on the binary
―on/off signals‖ that boundaries provide).236 These default packages can
work well if they place under a single owner‘s control a set of entitlements
that tend to be strongly complementary.237 But property in modern
231

For a case involving such an unusual interest, see Johnson v. Whiton, 34 N.E. 542 (Mass. 1893),
discussed in Merrill & Smith, supra note 215, at 20-21, 24-25.
232
This seems to follow from Smith‘s own analysis. See Smith, supra note 221, at 968 (―If I don't own
Blackacre, most of the time I know to keep off regardless of what the owner's uses and plans are for the land.‖);
see also Robinson, supra note 230, at 1485 (noting Smith‘s recognition of the different informational needs of
different ―audiences‖ and questioning how standardization of forms is helpful).
233
The spatial configuration of land represents another dimension along which standardization might
usefully proceed. See Gary D. Libecap & Dean Lueck, Land Demarcation Systems, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY LAW 257 (Kenneth Ayotte & Henry E. Smith eds., 2011) (examining the impact
of demarcation systems that generate land holdings in rectangular versus irregular configurations). Nothing in
the option exchange idea would be inconsistent with using regular, rectangular land holdings as ownership
platforms from which use rights might be traded; on the contrary, maintaining regularly-shaped boundaries would
ease administrative burdens in tracking alterations in use rights.
234
Robinson, supra note 230, at 1487-88. Merrill & Smith point out that some of the ways in which
property fails to achieve standardization involve observable characteristics, such as parcel size or shape. See
Merrill and Smith, supra note 215, at 34. But nonobservable elements can vary as well, as they recognize in
discussing future interests that place various conditions on property. See id. at 14; see also Robinson supra note
230, at 1487-88 (noting that difficulties in assessing watch quality are similar in kind to difficulties that
individuals might encounter in assessing an unusual timeshare arrangement involving the watch).
235
See Merrill & Smith, supra note 215, at 38-42; see also Arruñada, supra note 214.
236
See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 VA. L. REV. 965, 973
(2004) (explaining that ―an exclusion regime builds on simple on/off signals such as boundary crossings‖).
237
See Smith, supra note 153, at 1185, 1196 (discussing interaction between complementarity and
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metropolitan contexts is heavily interdependent; influences on value that
emanate from beyond the corners of the property regularly eclipse on-site
influences. This fact calls into question any assumption that the control
rights within a particular spatial shape are strong complements. Indeed,
traditional land use controls already belie any strong spatial
complementarity over control rights located within the owner‘s physical
boundaries; ownership prerogatives are regularly chipped away in favor of
collective property rights held by the community.238
What I suggest here is an ongoing and individualized process of finding
what is complementary and what is not, based on the judgments that
landowners themselves make. Because there are currently no good
mechanisms for loosening monopoly control on undervalued components,
what has been taken as strongly complementary may instead just be the
product of inertia and the lack of useful market mechanisms. At a
minimum, the intuitive case for strong spatial complementarity has been
significantly undermined. Property is no longer a protected capsule in
which the owner minds her own business; increasingly, what happens on or
with property seems to be everyone‘s business. The suggestion this essay
makes is that we explore the middle ground between public regulation and
private dominion to find out when elements within the traditional spatial
confines are best held not by the parcel owner, and not by the community,
but rather by one or a few neighbors.
2. Incomplete Property Rights
The ideas in this paper also intersect with theoretical work on
incomplete property rights.239 Following the literature on incomplete
contracts, this scholarship emphasizes the inevitable tradeoffs between
―front end‖ definitions of rights and ―back end‖ dispute resolution costs
arising from ill-defined rights.240 Thus, sharply defining rights ex ante—a
form of precautionary entitlement design—might or might not be costjustified in a given context.241 On this account, conflicts brew when
exclusion); Smith, supra note 13, at S471 (observing that ―in general we would expect a tendency to see the world
carved up into assets that embrace complementary sets of attributes, subject to the cost of doing so‖).
238
See ROBERT H. NELSON, ZONING AND PROPERTY RIGHTS 15-18 (1977) (describing zoning as ―a
collective property right‖); William A. Fischel, Equity and Efficiency Aspects of Zoning Reform, 27 PUB. POL'Y
301, 302 (1979) (explaining that zoning transfers property rights from landowners to the community).
239
See, e.g., Antonio Nicita et al. Towards a Theory of Incomplete Property Rights, American Law & Econ.
Assoc. Ann. Meetings (2008) http://works.bepress.com/antonio_nicita/3; Amnon Lehavi, The Dynamic Law of
Property: Theorizing the Role of Legal Standards 27-44 (June 2010), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1618768.
240
See, e.g., Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of Contract Design,
56 CASE W. RES. 187 (2005) (focusing on this tradeoff in the context of incomplete contracts). Recent work
examining this tradeoff in the property context includes Nicita et al., supra note 239, at 25 and Lehavi, supra note
239, at 12-13.
241
This insight builds on Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347,
354–55 (1967); see also Sterk, supra note 11.
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property rights are left incomplete (as they always must be, at some level).
Antonio Nicita and his coauthors explain that as novel uses emerge, new
―presumptive‖ rights accrue to owners based on the packages of rights they
already hold.242 The process may continue conflict-free, or the rights of two
or more owners may collide, generating externalities and calling out for a
sharper property definition.243
Incomplete property rights analysis offers one way of understanding
emerging dilemmas like that between solar power users and tree growers;
indeed, one of the examples that Nicita et al. discuss involves a tree that
grows to block a view.244 But this analysis is incomplete to the extent that it
suggests all externalities are a product of ill-defined rights.245 As the
discussion above has emphasized, what makes property so conflict-prone is
often the exact opposite—the fact that a person with a known right stands
on it and refuses to budge, even when the right carries little value for her.246
It is precisely this dynamic that has led some scholars to suggest that
ambiguity in rights can actually improve bargaining.247
With this caveat in mind, there are two important takeaway lessons for
the current project from the incomplete property literature. First is the basic
but crucial point that sometimes pursuing a finer-grained property
entitlement allocation ex ante will not be cost justified, whether because
information about potential uses or conflicts is absent, or because the work
of pinning down the respective rights exceeds the savings to be achieved
from reducing conflicts.248 Second, however, and directly relevant to the
option exchange platform, is the possibility that rights definition can be an
ongoing process in which the parties themselves participate. That
242

Nicita et al., supra note 239, at 13-15, 18.
Id. at 15. The notion of presumptive rights shares some common ground with the principle of accession,
which assigns rights to new property interests based on a prominent connection with existing property rights. See
Thomas W. Merrill, Accession and Original Ownership, 1 J. OF LEGAL ANALYSIS 459 (2009). But while
accession has been described as providing clear and unique answers, see id. at 475-76, the presumptive rights
developed by Nicita et al. may ultimately conflict, producing externalities. See Nicita et al., supra note 239, at 15
(―When two presumptive rights constitute a joint claim over a rival use they generate an externality‖) (emphasis
in original).
244
Nicita et al., supra note 239, at 12-14 (building on an example borrowed from Alchian, supra note 124);
but see Lehavi, supra note 239, at 34 (challenging the characterization of this conflict as a ―new‖ dispute).
245
See Nicita et al., supra note 239, at 26.
246
See, e.g., Christina Bohannan & Herbert Hovenkamp, IP and Antitrust: Reformation and Harm, 51 B.C.
L. REV. 905, 968 (2010) (observing that ―bilateral monopoly problems exist even when property rights are welldefined‖). This problem could be characterized as a form of incompleteness: incomplete specification of who
owns the right to which share of the surplus from trade. But this lack of specification is endemic to the notion of
alienable, separately held entitlements—further specification of surplus division moves away from an economic
model in which clearly defined rights are traded to one in which substitutes for trade are constructed.
247
See Jason Scott Johnston, Bargaining Under Rules versus Standards, 11 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 256 (1995);
Ayres & Talley, supra note 43, at 1027, 1034-35, 1073-78 (discussing and modeling this point, building on
Johnston‘s insight); see also supra note 152 (discussing potential benefits of bargaining in the shadow of liability
rules and noting disagreement in the literature).
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These costs include not only the ones that a legal system must incur to define and enforce rights, but also
the costs that parties must incur to learn about these rights and how they apply in a given situation, and to track
down the parties who hold them in order to negotiate a transfer. See Sterk, supra note 11, at 1296 (noting that
these latter costs would exist ―even when rules are, from an abstract legal perspective, crystal clear‖).
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participation need not be limited to the polar extremes of bargaining and
litigating, but can instead encompass a more nuanced interplay of signals
and intentions that works to forestall conflicts as they begin to emerge. It is
again helpful to consider a timeline in which potentially incompatible uses
initially appear without much direct conflict, then grow more and more
prevalent in increasingly closer proximity until a resolution of some sort is
required. An option exchange can help to identify these emerging issues,
reduce or delay conflicts over them, and provide data relevant to their
ultimate resolution (whether through flexibly traded entitlements or through
some other form of land use control).249
3. Abuse of Right
In recent theoretical work, Larissa Katz recommends addressing the
costs of ownership in a different manner: by importing the civil law notion
of ―abuse of right‖ as an independent limit on ownership prerogatives.250
This approach would seek to identify and outlaw those instances in which
ownership rights are being used in a socially harmful way to hold up
efficient new uses or to engage in inefficient spillover-producing
activities.251 If ownership can produce externalities, as I have suggested
throughout this essay, abuse of right represents an effort to catch those
externality generators who are producing the largest margins of harm over
benefit—the property rights equivalent of identifying people who throw
their empty bottles into the roadway. Yet, just as tracking down improper
disposal can be costly—indeed, so costly that our goals may be better
served by taxing all consumption and rewarding proper disposal—so too
the task of determining when an owner is using entitlements improperly can
generate excessive, and indeed prohibitive, costs.
Outside of a narrow category of ―animus‖ situations, such as true spite
fences, it is problematic to delineate what it means to be ―abusing‖ one‘s
right as an owner.252 If we define ―abuse‖ as misstating one‘s reservation
price in an effort to get a larger share of the gains from trade, virtually every
member of a market economy would be guilty. Most people assume that
ownership carries with it the preorgative to say things like ―I just can‘t part
249
We might learn, for example, that a given entitlement type is always or almost always more valuable in
one party‘s hands than another‘s, as is the case for ordinary airplane overflights. It might then become efficient to
redefine default bundles so that the entitlement in question begins life in a different package than the one
suggested by a ―geometric box.‖ See Sterk, supra note 12.
250
Larissa M. Katz, A Jurisdictional Principle of Abuse of Right (2010), unpublished manuscript available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1417955.
251
See id.
252
Katz argues for an abuse of right approach that would encompass both ―animus‖ and ―leverage‖
situations. See id. Although there may be proof problems in establishing animus, it is possible to draw a
conceptual line around this category of actions by owners. Not so for the ―leverage‖ category, which blends
seamlessly into the ordinary bargaining that is generally thought to be an incident of ownership.
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with this car for less than $8,000‖ even when $7,800 would really be
sufficient. Indeed, as Katz herself puts it, ―[o]wnership is generally seen as
conferring a bargaining chip.‖253 But a narrower definition of abusive
leverage is as elusive as the broader definition is unworkable. The
blockages that can dramatically impede efficient resolutions of land use
disputes come down to nothing more than the misrepresentation of one‘s
own reservation price (or an attempt to gain surplus based on the inferred
reservation prices of others), under monopoly conditions.254
Instead of attempting to tell ―good leverage‖ from ―bad leverage,‖ we
might do better to recognize that all exercises of the veto rights conferred by
ownership carry the potential to impose costs, insofar as they entrench a
particular set of use rights to the exclusion of other, incompatible uses. Far
from being an indictment of ownership, this point merely captures how
ownership works. Rather than condemn ownership for doing what it does,
we should price ownership so as to capture the effects of what it does.
Because paying that price will be relatively cheaper for those who are using
property in ways that generate gains for themselves, most of the abusive
uses of leverage that Katz condemns would be effectively deterred, without
our having had to identify them as independently problematic or distinguish
them from everyday uses of leverage that accompany ownership.
CONCLUSION
Property, alone among entitlement types, delivers a hefty dose of
personal control over a chunk of space for a potentially unlimited span of
time. Its accompanying veto power makes ownership incomparably
valuable and uniquely hazardous. While this power makes possible a wide
range of projects and endeavors,255 it also makes the rest of the world
vulnerable to the ways in which that power may be deployed. Often the
resulting collisions between power and vulnerability are efficient, but
sometimes the power that property conveys is superfluous, of little or no
value to the owners, but highly threatening to the potential projects of
nonowners. This essay has focused on finding a way to render less
253

See id. at 39.
See Harold Demsetz, Theoretical Efficiency in Pollution Control: Comments on Comments, 9 WESTERN
ECON. J. 444 (1971); see also Harold Demsetz, When Does the Rule of Liability Matter? 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 13,
22-25 (1972). To be sure, we might distinguish especially egregious ―pay me to stop‖ scenarios. In these cases, a
user strategically engages in an activity that produces no net benefit for her, simply to extract money from her
annoyed neighbor. For discussion of these tactics and some potential approaches to them, see Daniel B. Kelly,
Strategic Spillovers, 111 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011), draft available at SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1671692. The annoyer in these situations is misrepresenting not only the magnitude of
her reservation price but also its sign, making the use itself, and not just her later posturing over it, socially
wasteful.
255
See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 VA. L. REV. 965,
1022 (2004) (explaining how exclusion protects a ―wide and indefinite range of uses‖).
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hazardous these low-valued portions of the property package.
The accident analogy is helpful in this endeavor. By forcing attention
backwards to earlier decisions about the design of systems and entitlements,
it draws attention to undertheorized accident avoidance techniques. Chief
among these is entitlement design. In its current form, property is well on
its way to becoming a clunker that spews spatial externalities, maneuvers
like a tank, and regularly stalls out, creating bottlenecks that require the
societal equivalents of tow trucks to rearrange things by main force.
Keeping the models limited and doors locked will indeed keep property
legible and distinctive, but it may also consign it to irrelevance as the realm
of governance grows ever larger and the role of exclusion shrinks. It does
no good to insist that property maintain a pristine standardized form on the
outside if it will be gutted from within. If we wish to keep property alive as
a distinctive concept, it must be able to respond more sensitively and
flexibly to competing, spatially sensitive demands.256 That means looking
behind the ―keep off‖ signs to recognize and price the incursions into
flexibility that underlie that message.
As important as focusing attention in the right conceptual places is
focusing attention on the right chooser.257 I have suggested that, rather than
leave the property configurations up to collectives, parties (as potential least
cost avoiders) might be given incentives to customize their own entitlement
packages. By doing so when (and only when) it is worthwhile for them, the
total costs of land use accidents and their avoidance could be reduced. This
essay has only begun to sketch how trading platforms in land use options
might be constructed. But such transaction-cost mitigation systems are
likely to become increasingly important if we hope to keep property on the
road.

256
The relationship between flexibility and durability is a familiar but important theme in thinking about
how institutions operate over time. See, e.g., Korngold, supra note 199, at 1526-27 (recounting how Frank Lloyd
Wright‘s Tokyo Imperial Hotel weathered the 1923 Great Kanto Earthquake through the use of a ―floating
foundation‖ and suggesting that legal doctrine should take to heart ―[t]hese lessons of flexibility and humility in
the face of inevitable change and the unknown‖). But see David Super, Against Flexibility, 96 CORNELL L. REV.
(forthcoming 2011) (examining some of the costs of retaining flexibility).
257
See Krier & Schwab, supra note 17, at 470-71 (setting forth and discussing a ―best-chooser axiom‖ that
holds: ―All other things being equal, when liability rules are used the party who is the best chooser should be
confronted with the decision whether or not to force a sale upon the other party‖). What the analysis in this article
suggests is that one party might be the best positioned to decide whether to cede monopoly control, while a
different party might be in the best position to decide whether to complete a transaction following that
relinquishment.
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